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THE PRESIDENTIAL MONOPOLY OF 
FOREIGN RELATIONS 
Raoul Berger* 
A frequent recurrence to the fundamental principles of the consti-
tution • . • [is] absolutely necessary to preserve the advantages of 
liberty and to maintain a free government.-Massachusetts Consti-
tution of I 780t 
S OMETHING of the wonder that suffuses a child upon learning that a mighty oak sprang from a tiny acorn fills one who peers be-
hind the tapestry of conventional learning and beholds how meager 
are the sources of presidential claims to monopolistic control of for-
eign relations.1 Sweeping formulation of such claims was made by 
Woodrow Wilson, then president of Princeton University: 
One of the greatest of the President's powers ... [is] his control, 
which is very absolute, of the foreign relations of the nation. The 
initiative in foreign affairs, which the President possesses without 
any restriction whatever, is virtually the power to control them ab-
solutely. The President ... may guide every step of diplomacy, and 
to guide diplomacy is to determine what treaties must be made, if 
the faith and prestige of the government are to be maintained. He 
need disclose no step of negotiation until it is complete, and when 
in any critical matter it is completed the government is virtually 
committed. Whatever its disinclination, the Senate may feel itself 
committed also.2 
Wilson felt no need to advert to the constitutional problems pre-
sented by his statement, but apparently regarded it as dogma beyond 
need of demonstration. In his own person as President of the United 
States, Wilson was later to suffer a disastrous refutation when the 
Senate rejected the Versailles Treaty and League of Nations, which 
• Charles Warren Senior Fellow in American Legal History, Harvard University 
Law School. A.B. 1932, University of Cincinnati; J.D. 1935, Northwestern University; 
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I am indebted to Professor Milton Katz of the Harvard University Law School 
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t MAss. CONST., art. XXVIIl (1780), in I B. POORE, FEDERAL AND STATE CoNSTITU• 
TIONS, CoLONIAL CHARTERS 959 (1877). This constitution was John "Adams' handiwork." 
1 P. SMITH, JOHN ADAMS 440 (1962). The New Hampshire Constitution of 1784, art. I, 
§ 38, contains an almost identical provision, 2 B. PooRE, supra, at 1283, as does the 
Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776, art. XIV. 2 id. at 1542. 
I. The word "monopoly" is borrowed from the caption "Negotiation a Presidential 
Monopoly" in E. Corwin's 1953 revision of the official CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES OF .AMERICA-ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION 412. 
2. W. WILSON, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 77-78 (1908), 
[I] 
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he had negotiated according to his dogma. The cost of presidential 
absolutism came high.3 
Today, we are told, war is merely an instrument of foreign pol-
icy;4 four times in this century presidential foreign policy has entan-
gled us in great wars-World Wars I and II, Korea, and Vietnam.ls 
As Wilson indicated, the President's foreign policy can present the 
nation with an all but irreversible fait accompli.6 At a time when the 
havoc of war immediately threatens every man, woman, and child, 
when the sacrifices war requires in property, blood, even life itself, 
are staggering,7 it needs to be asked whether the Founders left such 
risks for the decision of a single man. 8 
3. Wilson stated that the "spirit of the Constitution" called on the President to 
keep "himself in confidential communication with the leaders of the Senate while 
his plans are in course, when their advice will be of service to him and his information 
of the greatest service to them, in order that there may be veritable counsel and a real 
accommodation of views instead of a final challenge and contest." Id. at 139-40. 
4. "[T]he military machine has simply become an instrument for achieving presiden-
tial policy objectives." Monaghan, Presidential War-Making, 50 B.U. L. REv. 19, lll 
(1970); Reveley, Presidential War-Making: Constitutional Prerogative or Usurpation?, 
55 VA. L. REv. 1243, 1245-46 (1969). Clausewitz, the pioneer military theorist, regarded 
war "as a continuation of national policy." B. TUCHMAN, THE GUNS OF AuGusr 95 
(1962). Our war in Vietnam is the creature of presidential foreign policy. 
5. Edward Corwin wrote: "Our three wars of outstanding importance prior to 
World War II were all the direct outcome of Presidential policies in the making 
of which Congress had but a minor part." E. CORWIN, TOTAL WAR AND THE CONSTI-
TUTION 13 (1947) [hereinafter CoRWIN, TOTAL WAR]. For Franklin Roosevelt's prewar 
policy, sees. MORISON, THE OXFORD HlsTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 991-1001 (1965). 
The President "has always possessed the power to bring the country to war, if he so 
chose." McDougal &: Lans, Treaties and Congressional-Executive or Presidential Agree-
ments: Interchangeable Instruments of National Policy (pts. 1-2), 54 YALE L.J. 181, 535, 
at 614 (1945). "[P]residential hegemony over the shaping of foreign policies ••• lead 
to the need to use armed forces." Reveley, supra note 4, at 1304. 
6. E. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS 274 (3d ed. 1948) [hereinafter 
CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT] refers to the "ability of the President simply by his day-to-day 
conduct of our foreign relations to create situations from which escape except by the 
route of war is difficult or impossible." The President may "so conduct the foreign 
intercourse, the diplomatic negotiations with other governments, as to force a 
war .•.. " J. POMEROY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES§ 672, at 447 (3d ed. 1875). See also Reveley, supra note 4, at 1245-47. Cf. text ac-
companying note 2 supra. The President "may conduct a vital phase of foreign policy 
literally for years without Congressional control, as with foreign policy toward Japan 
before the last war, toward Russia during the war, and toward China after the war." 
Such policy-making "may lead to policies for which there is inadequate support, as 
with Wilson, and had not Pearl Harbor intervened, conceivably with Roosevelt." R. 
DAHL, CONGRESS AND FOREIGN POLICY 173 (1950). 
7. As Hugh Gaitskill, leader of the British Labor Party, said in 1960, "[F]oreign 
affairs concern the lives and destinies of all of us today." Quoted in P. RxcHARDs, 
PARLIAMENT AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS 72 (1967). In England, "it has been abundantly 
clear to the majority of voters that their well-being and their very existence depends far 
more upon international developments than on domestic political issues." Id. at 31. 
8. "The conclusion is unavoidable, for example, that in the years preceding Pearl 
Harbor, President Roosevelt and his advisers believed that many of their foreign 
policies could not have secured the support of a majority in Congress. Important 
November 1972] Monopoly of Foreign Relations 3 
The mounting tide of "executive agreements," many of which 
are kept secret from the Senate,9 led the Senate in February 1972 to 
vote 81 to O for the Case Bill,10 which would require that all inter-
national agreements be sent to the Congress for information. Sen-
ator Sam J. Ervin, Jr., thereafter introduced a bill that would autho-
rize Congress to veto any executive agreement within sixty days of its 
transmittal.11 Do such bills constitute an unconstitutional invasion 
of exclusive presidential prerogatives? This question is a facet of the 
broader issue of "executive privilege": may information respecting 
the conduct of foreign affairs-for example, the disbursement of 
funds appropriated for defense12 or for foreign aid, 13 or the acquisi-
tion of foreign bases14-be withheld from Congress on the ground 
that congressional inquiry encroaches on presidential prerogatives? 
Because of the widespread ramifications of foreign relations, dis-
cussion must perforce be confined to presidential executive agree-
ments, and whether the Senate may be excluded from knowledge of, 
and participation in, negotiations with foreign nations as a part of 
the treaty-making process.15 Mention only can be made of the legis-
foreign policies were made without prior or subsequent congressional consent." R. 
DAHL, supra note 6, at 178. He adds: "President and State Department believed they 
had information, experience, and a grasp of issues involved that the Congress and 
electorate lacked." Id. at 180. 
9. See note 191 infra and accompanying text. 
10. S. 596, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. See ll8 CoNG. REc. S. 1904-10 (daily ed. Feb. 16, 1972). 
See generally N.Y. Times, May I, 1972, at 32, col. 1. For sequel, see note 14 infra. 
11. S. 3475, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. See ll8 CoNG. REc. S. 5787-88 (daily ed. April 11, 
1972). See generally N.Y. Times, May 1, 1972, at 32, col. I. For subsequent develop-
ments, see note 14 infra. 
12. Judge Learned Hand asked, "[I)s it not possible to argue that Congress, especially 
now that the appropriations for the Armed Forces are the largest items of the 
budget, should be allowed to inquire in as much detail as it wishes, not only how 
past appropriations have in fact been spent, but in general about the conduct of the 
national defense?" L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 17-18 (1958). 
13. See Hearings on S. 1125 Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the 
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1971) [hereinafter Hearings]. 
Senator J.W. Fulbright, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, testified: 
"I have made repeated efforts to secure access to the 5-year plan for military assistance 
for use by the Foreign Relations Committee in its consideration of military assistance 
under the foreign aid authorization bill." In vain. 
14. On June 19, 1972, the Senate voted to cut off funds for recently concluded 
military base agreements with Portugal and Bahrein unless the agreements are sub-
mitted to the Senate as treaties. The Executive did not comply with an earlier Senate 
resolution asking for submission of the executive agreements as treaties on the ground 
that they had already been concluded. ll8 CoNG. REc. S. 9653 (daily ed. June 19, 1972); 
N.Y. Times, June 20, 1972, at I, col. l; at 15, col. I. Many millions of dollars were 
involved. 
15. Recall Wilson's 1908 remark that the President "need disclose no step of 
negotiation until it is complete ••• [and then] the government is virtually com-
mitted," at text accompanying note 2 supra. True, Congress may reject a treaty, 
4 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 71:1 
lative shortcomings which have contributed to the all but total take-
over of foreign relations by the President, and of the need for proce-
dural reform in the Senate if its participation is to be effective.16 
Could we view the matter as an original question, that is, were we 
drafting or amending a Constitution and free to decide where power 
is best vested, such factors might persuade that exclusive power in 
the premises is best lodged in the President. Apart from the coun-
tervailing considerations, however, if the Constitution provides for 
Senate participation in treaty-making, the Senate cannot now be 
barred on the ground that it lacks the wisdom and machinery to 
participate effectively.17 "The peculiar circumstances of the moment," 
said Marshall, "may render a measure more or less wise, but cannot 
render it more or less constitutional."18 Accordingly, the focus of 
discussion will be the constitutionality of presidential monopoly 
claims. The starting place, of course, must be the constitutional 
text itself, in the light of such illumination as is provided by the 
intention of the Framers and the understanding of the Ratifiers. 
I. NEGOTIATION OF TREATIES 
A. The Text of the Constitution 
Article II, section 2, of the Constitution provides that the Presi-
dent 
shall have power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, 
to make Treaties ... and he shall nominate, and by and with the 
Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other 
public Ministers .... 
Section 3 provides that "he shall receive Ambassadors and other 
public Ministers . . . ." From these provisions Justice Sutherland 
distilled his often quoted statement that with respect to 
external affairs . . . participation in the exercise of the power is 
significantly limited. In this vast external realm . . . the President 
but the shift in policy may have "disastrous consequences for the international struc-
ture of power." R. DAHL, supra note 6, at 97. 
16. For an excellent discussion of the entire problem, see R. DAHL, supra note 6. 
See also text accompanying notes 293-311 infra. 
17. For improvements in the congressional machinery, see R. DAHL, supra note 6, 
at 146-48. Many consider the presidential policy that involved us in the Vietnam War a 
monumental folly, among them General Charles de Gaulle. See Berger, War-Making by 
the President, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 29, 83 (1972) [hereinafter Berger, War-Making]. R. 
DAHL, supra, at 264, states that "to the extent that the executive is capable of solving 
its problems without accepting Congressional collaboration, it must become more and 
more the democratic shadow" of a "frank dictatorship." See also id. at 116. 
18. G. GUNTHER, JOHN MARsHALL's DEFENSE OF McCULLOCH v. MARYLAND 190-91 
(1969). 
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alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative of the 
nation. He makes treaties with the advice and consent of the Senate; 
but he alone negotiates. Into the field of negotiation the Senate can-
not intrude; and Congress itself is powerless to invade it.19 
5 
When, however, we look to the text, we find that the only power 
given to the President alone was the power to "receive Ambassadors." 
Even the power to "appoint Ambassadors" was made subject to 
Senate "advice and consent." 
Some years after the Constitutional Convention, Hamilton placed 
exaggerated emphasis on the power to receive Ambassadors,20 ignor-
ing the pains he himself took in The Federalist No. 69 to down-
grade the power: 
The President is also to be authorized to receive ambassadors and 
other public ministers. This, though it has been a rich theme of 
declamation, is more a matter of dignity than of authority. It is a 
circumstance which will be without consequence in the administra-
tion of the government; and it was far more convenient . . . than 
that there should be a necessity of convening the legislature . . . 
upon every arrival of a foreign minister . . . .21 
Before he ascended to the bench, Justice Sutherland wrote a book 
in which he stated: "It will be observed that the advice and consent 
of the Senate qualifies the power of the President to make, and not 
to negotiate, treaties."22 The wish was father to that thought. No 
mention whatever of "negotiate" is to be found in the constitutional 
text, so that it could hardly be singled out for qualification. What 
power to "negotiate" a treaty exists must derive from the power to 
"make" a treaty; and since the "make" power is expressly subject to 
"advice and consent," it follows that the power to "negotiate" a 
treaty is likewise so qualified. Nor does history disclose an intention 
to separate the "negotiate" component for independent presidential 
exercise; to the contrary, as will appear, the Founders intended the 
Senate to participate in all stages of treaty-making. They knew well 
enough how to single out a particular function for independent 
presidential exercise, as when they provided that the President 
19. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936) (emphasis 
original). It should be borne in mind that in addition to participation in treaty-making 
and the appointment of ambassadors by the Senate, Congress has exclusive power over 
other aspects of foreign relations, namely, foreign commerce and duties or tariffs. U.S. 
CoNsr. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, 3. 
20. See text accompanying notes 90-92 infra. 
21. THE FEDERALIST No. 69, at 451 (Mod. Lib. ed. 1941). 
22. G. SUTHERLAND, CoNSTITITl'IONAL POWER AND WORLD AFFAIRS 122 (1919) (emphasis 
original). 
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"shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the 
Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors .... " The fact that they did not 
equally provide that "he shall negotiate, and by and with the Advice 
and Consent of the Senate, make treaties" speaks volumes against 
the Sutherland reading. The comparison was tellingly drawn by 
Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, himself no mean historian: 
[T]he carefully phrased section gives the President absolute and un-
restricted right to nominate, and the Senate can only advise and 
consent to the appointment, of a given person. All right to interfere 
in the remotest degree with the power of nomination and the conse-
quent power of selection is wholly taken from the Senate. Very 
different is the wording of the treaty clause. There the words "by 
and with the advice and consent of" come in after the words "shall 
have power" and before the power referred to is defined. The "advice 
and consent of the Senate" are therefore coextensive with the 
"power" conferred on the President, which is "to make treaties," 
and apply to the entire process of treaty-making.23 
As Lodge's analysis indicates, the textual terms are to be scruti-
nized with greatest care, the more so because the Framers were fas-
tidious draftsmen. What Chief Justice Taney discerned on the face 
of the Constitution is richly attested by the Convention records: 
"[N]o word was unnecessarily used, or needlessly added .... Every 
word appears to have been weighed with the utmost deliberation, 
and its force and effect to have been fully understood.''24 
What does the word "advice" connote? As early as 1806, Senator 
Anderson pointed out that the "advice should precede the making 
of the treaty," that the word was employed "for the purpose of ob-
taining the opinion of the Senate as to the principles upon which the 
treaty should be made.''25 In 1906, Senator Augustus Bacon devel-
oped this analysis: "We do not advise men after they have made up 
their minds and after they have acted; we advise men while they are 
considering, while they are deliberating, and before they have de-
termined, and before they have acted."26 Unless "advice" is so under-
stood, it is superfluous; it would have sufficed to require only Senate 
"consent" for the "making" of a treaty. So the process was understood 
by President Washington.27 
In 1917, Edward S. Corwin countered with the argument that "in 
23. Quoted in R. HAYDEN, THE SENATE AND TREATIES: 1787-1817, at 17 (1920). 
24. Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540, 571 (1840). 
25. Quoted in R. HAYDEN, supra note 23, at 202 n.1. 
26. 40 CONG. R.Ec. 2126. 
27. See text accompanying notes 62-77 infra. See also remarks of Rufus King, who 
had been a Framer, text accompanying note 141 infra. 
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connection with appointments the Senate's function of 'advice and 
consent' is discharged by a mere 'yes' and 'no.' "28 "Advice" does not 
come too late when it surfaces after a "nomination," for the nomina-
tion has in nowise committed the President or the nation. But to be 
effective, "advice" respecting "making" of a treaty must come before 
the positions of the negotiating parties have crystallized. In any event, 
Corwin leaves unanswered why "nomination" was freed of "advice 
and consent" whereas "treaty-making" was not. He himself later 
stated that "the Constitutional clause evidently assumes that the 
President and the Senate will be associated throughout the entire 
process of making a treaty ... .''29 
B. The Understanding of the Founders 
Few are the instances in which deductions from the text are so 
unmistakably confirmed by the meaning attached to the terms by 
the Founders themselves. But first a glimpse of the English anteced-
ents, for the Framers were constantly alive to English practices.30 
Perhaps the most extensive claim to participation in foreign af-
fairs was made by the House of Commons in a petition to James I 
of December 9, 1621, which stated with respect to matters of peace 
and war, "we cannot conceive that ... the state of your kingdom, are 
matters at any time unfit for our deepest consideration in time of 
Parliament ... .''31 The constitutional changes in the conduct of for-
28. E. CoRWIN, THE PRESIDENT'S CONTROL OF FOREIGN RELATIONS 183 n.4 (1917) 
(emphasis original) [hereinafter CORWIN, CONTROL]. 
29. E. CORWIN, supra note 1, at 412. In THE PRESIDENT, supra note 6, at 253, Corwin 
states that the "significant thing" about the phraseology of the treaty-clause "is 
that it associates the President with the Senate throughout the entire process of treaty-
making." (Emphasis original.) McDougal &: Lans, supra note 5, at 553, state: "The 
Framers assumed ••• that the Senate would participate equally with the President in 
the active direction of all negotiations and all aspects of foreign policy •••• " See also 
id. at 220. Compare ·with the foregoing history Dean Acheson's assertion that "the 
negotiation of [a treaty] is given to one branch and the ratification to another." 
Hearings, supra note 13, at 264. He considered that the Senate was limited to "exer-
cising its constitutional power to make a treaty by ratifying it." Id. at 261. 
30. On a related point, George Mason said in the Convention, "He considered the 
caution observed in Great Britain on this point as the paladium [sic] of the public 
liberty." 2 M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 327 (1911). 
Madison referred to British appropriation practices in THE FEDERALIST No. 41, supra 
note 21, at 265. Madison, John Marshall, and others assured the Virginia convention 
that the provision for jury trial carried with it all its attributes under English practice; 
including, specifically, the right to challenge jurors. 3 J. ELLIOT, DEBATES IN THE 
SEVERAL CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 531, 546, 
558-59, 573 (2d ed. 1836). See R. BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE CoNSTITUnONAL PROBLEMS 
87 n.160, 143 n.97, 197, 217-18 (1972) [hereinafter BERGER, IMPEACHMENT]. Cf. id. at 4, 
30 n.107, 89, 98, 99, 101, 122, 171 n.217. See also note 45 infra. 
31. J. TANNER, CONSI'ITUTIONAL DOCUMENTS OF THE REIGN OF JAMES I, A.D. 1603• 
1625, at 281 (1930). 
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eign affairs during the revolutionary seventeenth century-by which 
the Founders were more influenced than by eighteenth century de-
velopments32-have been admirably described by Edward B. Turner, 
and for present purposes a few examples drawn from Turner may 
suffice. By virtue of its power over supplies, Parliament constrained 
the headstrong James I to promise "to make no treaty without first ac-
quainting parliament and requesting its advice."33 When "the long 
parliament was sitting the king informed the members of the alliance 
which he was about to make with the Dutch, and asked for advice."3' 
After the Restoration, "the commons aimed at nothing less than di-
rection and control .... More and more, information was called for, 
and the commons insisted on a share in foreign policy if they were to 
supply the means of carrying it out."35 In 1763, "the lord chancellor 
declared ... that 'the King ... hath made your Counsels the Foun-
dation of all His Proceedings' [abroad]."36 The Parliament objected 
that negotiations respecting the second partition treaty (1700) "had 
been carried through without the advice of parliament" and "then 
proceeded to impeach those who had assisted William in making 
it."37 In the Hanoverian period, the "participation of parliament in 
foreign affairs and even its supervision of them was . . . fully recog-
nized, but not its power to direct them."38 By 1714, "Parliament 
32. B. BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN R.EvOLUTION (1967). 
Compare colonial reliance on Coke for judicial review, notwithstanding that Blackstone 
had plumped for "parliamentary supremacy," R. BERGER, CONGRESS v. THE SUPREME 
CoURT 23-26, 29 n.101 (1969) [hereinafter BERGER, CONGRESS]; and their frequent refer-
ences to Stuart absolutism, BERGER, IMFEACHMENT, supra note 30, at 5, 99; Goebel, 
Constitutional History and Constitutional Law, 38 CoLUM. L. REv. 555, 563 (1938); 
note 45 infra. 
33. Turner, Parliament and Foreign Affairs, 1603-1760, 38 ENG. Hisr. REv. 172, 
174 (1919). 
34. Id. at 175. 
35. Id. at 176. 
36. Id. at 177. In 1701 the Commons advised the King to act in concert with the 
States General in treaty negotiations with France "to conduce to their security": the 
King responded he had done so. 5 PARL. Hisr. ENG. 1243 (1701). The King communi-
cated the posture of the negotiations and in closing said that the "safety of England ••• 
does very much depend upon your Resolutions in this matter." Id. at 1250. In 1709, 
both Houses advised Queen Anne as to measures for a secure peace. 6 PARL. Hisr. 
ENG. 788 (1709). 
37. Turner, supra note 33, at 183. In 1715 the Commons "impeached Oxford be-
cause ••• he had misrepresented negotiations to the queen and hence to parliament," 
and so "prevented the just Advice of the Parliament to her Majesty." Id. at 188. Was it 
sheer coincidence that James Iredell told the North Carolina Ratification Convention 
that if the President "has concealed important intelligence" from the Senate and so 
induced them to consent to a treaty, he could be impeached? 4 J. ELuoT, supra note 
30, at 127. 
38. Turner, supra note 33, at 188. 
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had established a degree of control over the executive and over all 
its actions-including foreign policy .... "89 
All this was part of the struggle between Parliament and the 
King, which eventuated in parliamentary supremacy.40 Thereafter 
came ministerial responsibility to Parliament rather than to the 
King, and management of foreign affairs by Ministers who, under 
orthodox theory, were under the control of Parliament. What such 
control could mean is illustrated by a resolution passed by the House 
of Commons in 1782-not without relevance to President Nixon's 
disregard of the repeal of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution41-con-
demning the "farther prosecution" of the war with the American 
colonies on the ground that it was the means of "weakening the ef-
forts of this country against her European enemies" and increasing 
the "mutual enmity, so fatal to the interests both of Great Britain 
and America."42 When the ministry disregarded this resolution, a 
second resolution declared that "this House will consider as enemies" 
those who advise the "farther prosecution" of the war "for the pur-
pose of reducing the revolted Colonies to obedience by force." Now 
Lord North buckled and bowed to the opinion of Parliament.48 
The Founders, who cited the ongoing impeachment of Warren Hast-
ings,« were hardly unfamiliar with these pages of Hansard.45 
When the revolting colonies assembled in the Continental Con-
gress and dispensed with an executive, they carried the movement 
39. c. HILL, THE CENTURY OF REvoLUTION 1603-1714, at 2 (1961). Parliament had 
emerged "as the leading partner." G. TREVELYAN, ILLUSTRATED HISTORY OF ENGLAND 
472 (1956). 
40. See generally C. ROBERTS, THE GROWTH OF REsl'ONSIBLE GoVERNMENT 1N STUART 
ENGLAND (1966). 
41. Berger, War-Making, supra note 17, at 67. 
42. 22 PARL. HIST. ENG. 1071 (1781-1782). 
43. Id. at 1089, 1090, 1107 (1781-1782). 
44. E.g., George Mason, 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 30, at 550; John Vining, I ANNALS 
OF CONG. 373 (1789) (2d ed. 1836, print bearing the running page title "History of 
Congress"). 
45. Hamilton's statement in THE FEDERALIST No. 69, supra note 21, at 450-51 may 
suggest unfamiliarity with the English developments: "The king of Great Britain is 
the sole and absolute representative of the nation in all foreign transactions. He can 
of his own accord make treaties of peace, commerce • • • ." But he emphasized: "In 
this respect • • • there is no comparison between the intended power of the President 
and the actual power of the British sovereign. The one can perform alone what the 
other can do only with the concurrence of a branch of the legislature." 
But compare Gouverneur Morris' reminder that in England "the real King [is] 
the Minister." 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 30, at 104. Cf. id. at 69. Note too the Founders' 
familiarity with the details of English impeachment practices. BERGER, IMPEACHMENT, 
supra note 30, at 54-55, 74-75, 84-85, 88-89. See also Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 
108-09 (1925). 
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for parliamentary supremacy to its logical conclusion. Experience 
led them to make an exception for a Secretary of Foreign Affairs, 
and John Jay was appointed to the post.46 But he was kept under a 
tight rein, as the Journals of the Congress disclose. There could be 
no secrets from Congress: "Any member of Congress shall have ac-
cess" to the Secretary's books and records, read the resolution.47 
To argue that all this was changed by the constitutional provision 
for an executive branch and the separation of powers is to lose sight 
of the course of historical development. The Framers-thirty of the 
fifty-five had been members of the Continental Congress48-began 
by adopting its practice. As late as August 6, the Convention Com-
mittee on Detail draft provided that "[t]he Senate ... shall have 
power to make treaties."49 During the debate, Madison "observed 
that the Senate represented the States alone," and, consequently, 
"the President should be an agent [not the exclusive agent] in Trea-
ties."50 As the Convention drew to a close, the Committee of Eleven 
proposed on September 4 that "[t]he President by and with the ad-
vice and Consent of the Senate, shall have power to make Treaties.''51 
How this appeared to the Framers may be judged from Rufus King's 
remarks that "as the Executive was here joined in the business, there 
was a check [ on the Senate] which did not exist in [the Continental] 
Congress.''52 It was the President, therefore, who was :finally made a 
participant in the treaty-making process, which had been initially 
lodged-after the pattern of the Continental Congress-in the Sen-
46. 19 JOUR. CoNTL. CONG. 43 (1781); 20 JOUR. CoNTL. CoNG. 638 (1781). 
47. 22 JOUR. CoNTL. CONG. 88 (1782). 
48. The dual members were Abraham Baldwin, George Clymer, John Dickinson, 
Thomas Fitzsimons, Benjamin Franklin, Elbridge Gerry, Nicholas Gilman, Nathaniel 
Gorham, Bedford Gunning, Alexander Hamilton, Jared Ingersoll, Daniel of St. Thomas 
Jenifer, William S. Johnson, Rufus King, John Langdon, James Madison, James 
McHenry, Thomas Mifllin, Gouverneur Morris, Robert Morris, William Pierce, Charles 
Pinckney, Edmund Randolph, George Read, John Rutledge, Roger Sherman, Richard 
0. Spaight, George Washington, Hugh Williamson, and James Wilson. 
The New Jersey Plan proposed to vest in Congress certain powers "in addition to 
the powers vested in the United States in Congress, by the present existing articles of 
Confederation." l M. FARRAND, supra note 30, at 243. In the New York Ratification 
Convention, Chancellor R.R. Livingston explained that the Continental Congress "have 
the very same" powers proposed for the new Congress, including the power "of 
making war and peace ••• they may involve us in a war at their pleasure .••• " 2 J. 
ELLIOT, supra note 30, at 278 (emphasis added). 
49. 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 30, at 183. 
50. Id. at 392. 
51. Id. at 498. 
52. Id. at 540. "Not until September 7, ten days before the Convention's final ad-
journment, was the President made a participant in those powers." E. Corwin, supra 
note I, at 412. Commenting on the concurrence of the two branches to make a treaty, 
Patrick Henry stated "the President, as distinguished from the Senate, is nothing." 
3 J. ELLIOT, supra note 30, at 353. 
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ate alone. Not the slightest hint is to be found in the Convention 
records that thereby the President was meant to nose out the Senate 
from participation in any part of treaty-making. To the contrary, 
Hamilton explained in The Federalist No. 75 that 
the vast importance of the trust, and the operation of treaties as laws, 
plead strongly for the participation of the whole or a portion of the 
legislative body in the office of making them .... It must indeed be 
clear to a demonstration that the joint possession of the power in 
question, by the President and Senate, would afford a greater pros-
pect of security, than the separate possession of it by either of them.53 
The same point had earlier been made by John Jay in The Federal-
ist No. 64, and though he appreciated that negotiations with those 
who preferred to "rely on the secrecy of the President" might arise, 
he stressed that such secrecy was with respect to "those preparatory 
and auxiliary measures which are not otherwise important in a na-
tional view, than as they tend to facilitate the attainment of the ob-
jects of the negotiations." The President, "in forming [treaties] must 
act by the advice and consent of the Senate."54 Corwin correctly reads 
Jay to mean that "[o]ccasions may arise ... when the initiation of 
a negotiation may require great secrecy and dispatch, and at such 
times the President must undoubtedly start the ball rolling; but 
otherwise all negotiations of treaties will be the joint concern of 
President and Senate."55 
The Ratification Conventions were given to understand that the 
Senate, without qualification, was to participate in the making of 
treaties. Some cumulative detail may be pardoned because of the 
importance of this point. In New York, Chancellor R.R. Livingston 
stated that the Senate "are to form treaties with foreign nations"; 
and Hamilton explained that "[t]hey, together with the President, 
are to manage all our concerns with foreign nations." Chancellor 
Livingston repeated that "[t]he Senate was to transact all foreign 
business."56 In Pennsylvania, James Wilson said, "nor is there any 
doubt but the Senate and President possess the power of making" 
53. THE FEDERALIST No. 75, supra note 21, at 486, 488. 
54. Id., No. 64, at 419, 420. 
55. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT, supra note 6, at 253 (emphasis added). James Wilson 
told the Pennsylvania Convention, "I am not an advocate for secrecy in transactions 
relating to the public; not generally even in forming treaties . • • yet sometimes 
secrecy may be necessary, and therefore it becomes an argument against committing the 
knowledge of these transactions to too many persons," that is, the House of Repre-
sentatives. 2 J. Eu.IoT, supra note 30, at 506: the stock explanation why the House 
was excluded from treaty-making. See, e.g., 3 id. at 509, 4 id. at 263, 280. 
56. 2 J. ELLIOT, supra note 30, at 291, 306, 323. 
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treaties.117 In North Carolina, Samuel Spencer stated that the Senate 
"are, in effect to form treaties."58 And speaking to "intercourse with 
foreign powers," James Iredell said that it is the President's "duty 
to impart to the Senate every material intelligence he receives." If 
he "has concealed important intelligence . . . and by that means 
induced them [the Senate] to enter into measures ... which they 
would not have consented to had the true state of things been dis-
closed to them," impeachment would lie.59 With good reason, there-
fore, do even those commentators who construe the President's au-
thority broadly agree that "the Senate was made a participant in 
his diplomatic powers."60 Indeed, it would fly in the face of common 
sense to deduce that the Framers, after taking great precautions, as 
Jam.es Wilson said, to put it beyond the power of a "single man ... 
to involve us in such distress [war],"61 then unraveled all their labors 
by giving sole control of foreign policy, which can plunge a nation 
into war, to that very "single man." 
C. Washington's Contemporaneous 
Construction 
Were the meaning of the constitutional text and the understand-
ing of the Framers and Ratifiers doubtful, we have the best of con-
57. Id. at 506. 
58. 4 id. at 116. 
59. Id. at 127. William Davie, a Framer, explained to the North Carolina Conven-
tion "that jealousy of executive power which has shown itself so strongly in all 
American governments, would not admit" of lodging the treaty power in the Presi-
dent alone. And because of "the extreme jealousy of the little states" it "became 
necessary to give them an absolute equality in making treaties." Id. at 120. In other 
words, Senate participation in treaty-making was required to satisfy small state 
jealousy. C.C. Pinckney's remark in the South Carolina Convention that the Senate 
was given "the power of agreeing or disagreeing to the terms proposed" by the 
President, id. at 265, is opposed to the decided consensus that treaty-making was a 
joint function. 
60. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT, supra note 6, at 366, 254; McDougal &: Lans, supra 
note 5, at 207, 220. See also note 29 supra and accompanying text. Indeed, Corwin, 
looking at "the constitutional landscape," concluded that "the legislative power, was 
evidently intended originally to be the predominant one." CORWIN, TOTAL WAR, supra 
note 5, at 158. Were confirmation needed, Madison's statement in THE FEDERAusr No. 
51, supra note 21, at 338, should suffice: "In republican government, the legislative 
authority necessarily predominates." 
61. 2 J. ELLIOT, supra note 30, at 528. That acute student of constitutional govern-
ment, Walter Bagehot, said that the Framers "shrank from placing sovereign power 
anywhere. They feared it would generate tyranny; George ill had been a tyrant to 
them, and come what might, they would not make a George III." W. BAGEHOT, THE 
ENGLISH CoNmTUTION 218 (1964). It is virtually beyond debate that the intention of 
the Founders was to confer all power connected with war-making on Congress, leaving 
to the President only command of the armed forces and authority to repel sudden 
attack. See text accompanying notes 125-26 infra. For extended discussion, see Berger, 
War-Making, supra note 17. 
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temporaneous constructions62-by the presiding officer of the Con-
vention, George Washington, our first President. In August 1789, 
he advised a Senate committee that 
[i]n all matters respecting Treaties, oral communications [to the 
Senate] seem indispensably necessary; because in these a variety of 
matters are contained, all of which not only require consideration, 
but some of them may undergo much discussion; to do which by 
written communications would be tedious without being satisfac-
tory. as 
Oral communications proved impracticable; but Washington con-
tinued to seek the Senate's advice by message before opening nego-
tiations and "during their course."64 
The facts have been beclouded by Corwin, who stated in 1917: 
"At the outset, Washington sought to associate the Senate with him-
self in the negotiation of treaties, but this method of proceeding 
went badly and was presently abandoned."65 So, too, McDougal and 
Lans stated in 1945, 
it is clear that the Framers anticipated that the Senate would 
normally function as an executive council, advising the President or 
his subordinates during the course of negotiations, as had been the 
case under the Articles of Confederation. This proposal for continu-
ous consultation or for any significant degree of advance consultation 
proved to be unworkable, and was abandoned during the adminis-
tration of George Washington.66 
All that "proved to be unworkable," however, was oral consultation 
with the Senate, and this because such was the awe in which Wash-
ington was held that the Senate felt inhibited from necessary debate 
by his presence. 
In Washington's own view, treaties called for the independent 
legislative judgment of the Senate. "In treaties," he wrote, the 
agency of the Senate "is perhaps as much of a legislative nature, and 
62. Respect for contemporaneous construction is deeply rooted in the past. In 
1454, Chief Justice Prisot stated, "the Judges who gave these decisions in ancient times 
were nearer to the making of the statute than we now are, and had more acquaintance 
with it •••• " Windham v. Felbridge, Y.B. 33 Hen. 4, f. 38, 41 pl. 17, quoted in 
C. Au.EN, I.Aw IN THE MAKING 193 (6th ed. 1958). For early American statements to the 
same effect, see Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299, 309 (1803); Ogden v. Saunders, 
25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 290 (1827). 
63. 11 G. WASIDNGTON, WRITINGS 417 (W. Ford ed. 1891) (emphasis original). 
64. S. CRANDALL, TREATIES, THEIR MAKING AND ENFORCEMENT 68 (2d ed. 1916); 
D. FLEMING, THE TREATY VEIO OF THE .AMERICAN SENATE 21 (1930): Washington "ad-
hered to the practice of asking the advice of the Senate before negotiations were 
opened and during their course." 
65. CoRWIN, CoNTROL, supra note 28, at 85. 
66. McDougal &: Lans, supra note 5, at 207. 
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the business may possibly be referred to their deliberations in their 
legislative chamber."67 For details of Washington's first and last 
visits to the Senate, we are indebted to the J oumal of Senator Wil-
liam Maclay. Washington told the Senate that "he had called on us 
for our advice and consent to some propositions respecting the treaty 
to be held with the southern Indians."68 Those propositions were 
stated under seven heads in a paper handed over by Washington. 
Maclay spoke up: "The business is new to the Senate. It is of impor-
tance. It is our duty to inform ourselves, as well as possible, on the 
subject." Lee wanted to read a particular treaty. "The business la-
bored with the Senate. There appeared an evident reluctance to 
proceed." Gunn then moved that a treaty with the Creeks be post-
poned until Monday; his motion was seconded. Maclay noted, "I 
saw no chance of a fair investigation of subjects while the President 
of the United States sat there, with his Secretary of War to support 
his opinions, and overawe the timid and neutral part of the Senate." 
The motion carried. Washington, Maclay records, was in a "violent 
fret." Nevertheless, he appeared again on Monday, and again, 
"shamefacedness, or I know not what, flowing from the presence of 
the President, kept everybody silent."69 Oral communication, so un-
comfortable to all concerned, was thereupon abandoned. But that 
"\,Vashington continued to seek advice from the Senate "before open-
ing negotiations" is attested by a series of instances collected by 
Crandall, and confirmed by others.70 
To demonstrate "the right of the President to refuse the Senate 
information with respect to a pending negotiation," Corwin alleges 
that "this ground was first asserted by Washington against a call by 
the House of Representatives for information with respect to the 
negotiation of the Jay Treaty of 1794.''71 This is a strange citation, 
for "in fact, all the papers affecting the negotiations . . . were laid 
67. 11 G. WASHINGTON, supra note 63, at 418. 
68. W. MACLAY, SKETCHES OF DEBATES IN THE FIRST SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, 
1789-90-91, at 122 (G. Harris ed. 1880). 
69. Id. at 123-26. See also R. HAYDEN, supra note 23, at 20-27. Washington himself 
realized that "it could be no pleasing thing . . • for the President, on the one hand, 
to be present and hear the propriety of his nominations questioned, nor for the 
Senate, on the other hand, to be under the smallest restraint from his presence from 
the fullest and freest inquiry into the character of the person nominated." 11 
G. WASHINGTON, supra note 63, at 418. That his presence would exercise a similar 
"restraint" on the Senate's "inquiry" into a treaty escaped him. 
70. S. CRANDALL, supra note 64, at 68-70; R. HAYDEN, supra note 23, at 27-28, 
32-34, 40, 47, 51-52, 54-55; Black, The United States Senate and the Treaty Power, 4 
RocKY MT. L. R.Ev. I, 6 (1931). See also note 64 supra. The practice, however, was not 
invariable. R. HAYDEN, supra, at 37. 
71. CORWIN, CONTROL, supra note 28, at 90. 
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before the Senate.''72 The denial to the House was based on Wash-
ington's view that the treaty power was vested exclusively in the 
President and Senate, so that there was no "right in the House of 
Representatives to demand . . . all the papers respecting a negotia-
tion with a foreign Power .... " He emphasized that he had no dis-
position to "withhold any information ... which could be required 
of him as a right," instancing an impeachment proposal by the 
House.73 This is poor stuff from which to fashion a right to refuse 
to the Senate information respecting pending negotiations. 
A second point later made by Corwin stands no better. For his 
statement that "the relations of President and Senate in the realm 
of diplomacy came rapidly to assume a close approach to their present 
form," he relies on the Jay Treaty as "a prime illustration" of a 
treaty negotiated "under instructions in the framing of which the 
Senate had no hand ... .''74 At this time, the Federalists were in 
control of the Senate, and four Federalists, Oliver Ellsworth, George 
Cabot, Caleb Strong and Rufus King "were the backbone of the 
administration party in the Senate" and "dominated the entire pro-
ceeding." They suggested both the mission and the plenipotentiary 
to Washington, and then pressed Chief Justice John Jay to accept 
the post.7is In effect, the Senate acted "through a small number of 
its members in whom both the executive and a majority of their col-
leagues had great confidence." In instructing the envoy, "the Sena-
torial group still exercised a powerful if not a predominant influ-
ence.''76 As Hayden observed: "The entire procedure, certainly, is 
very similar to that by which it later became customary to consult 
the Senate through the Committee on Foreign Relations before any 
important negotiation was embarked upon.''77 
D. Marshall's "Sole Organ" of Foreign Relations 
One of the other pillars of the claimed presidential monopoly of 
foreign relations is John Marshall's famed statement in 1799 that 
"[t]he President is the sole organ of the nation in its external rela-
tions."78 Upon this statement Justice Sutherland uncritically relied 
72. 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 760 (1796). 
73. Id. at 760-61. For a discussion of the incident, see Berger, Executive Privilege 
v. Congressional Inquiry, 12 UCLA L. REv. 1043, 1085-86 (1965) [hereinafter :Berger, 
Privilege]. 
74. CoRWIN, THE PRFSIDENT, supra note 6, at 257. 
75. R. HAYDEN, supra note 23, at 63, 65, 67, 92. 
76. Id. at 71, 72. Cf. id. at 92. 
77. Id. at 73. 
78. 10 ANNALS OF CoNG. 613 (1800). 
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in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,19 and it was later 
cited by Justice Douglas in United States v. Pink.Bo Thus embold-
ened by "that arch constitutional conservative"B1-Justice Suther-
land, McDougal and Lans concluded that Marshall "indicated the 
constitutional basis for the consummation of direct Presidential [ ex-
ecutive] agreements,"B2 from which the Senate was excluded. So it 
is that uncritical repetition of a statement torn from its context has 
raised it to the level of dogma. 
Marshall spoke in the House of Representatives to the extradi-
tion of one Jonathan Robbins, charged with murder by Great Britain 
and surrendered to the British authorities without judicial hearing 
upon the order of President John Adams, who acted under an exist-
ing treaty.Ba Adams was under attack on the ground that the matter 
of surrender was for the courts, not the President. Patently, the par-
ticipation of the Senate in treaty negotiations or in any other facet 
of foreign affairs was not remotely involved. The Robbins affair, 
replied Marshall, involved "a national demand made upon the na-
tion" and was therefore 
not a case for judicial cognizance . . . . The President is the sole 
organ of the nation in its external relations, and its sole representa-
tive with foreign nations. Of consequence, the demand of a foreign 
nation can only be made on him. 
He is charged to execute the laws. A treaty is declared to be a 
law. He must then execute a treaty .... 
Ought not [the President] to perform the object, although the 
particular mode of using the means has not been prescribed? Con-
gress, unquestionably, may prescribe the mode, and Congress may 
devolve on others the whole execution of the contract; but, till this 
be done, it seems the duty of the Executive department, to execute 
the contract by any means it possesses.B4 
79. 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936). 
80. 315 U.S. 203, 229 (1942). 
81. McDougal & Lans, supra note 5, at 255. 
82. Id. at 249-50. 
83. CoRWIN, CONTROL, supra note 28, at 99. 
84. 10 ANNALS OF CoNG. 613-14 (emphasis added). In his influential The Presi-
dent's Control of Foreign Relations, Corwin stated that the "President is the organ of 
diplomatic intercourse ••• first, because of his powers in connection with the reception 
and dispatch of diplomatic agents and with treaty-making; secondly, because of the 
tradition of executive power adherent to his office." CORWIN, CONTROL, supra note 28, 
at 33. It follows, he stated, that "this power is presumptively his alone," id. at 35, 
and from this he glided into the "necessity of preserving to the President his full con-
stitutional discretion in the conduct of our foreign relations." Id. at 37. But the power 
to "receive" ambassadors, Hamilton explained, was "without consequence," "more a 
matter of dignity than of authority." See text accompanying note 21 supra. And the 
treaty power requires Senate participation all along the way. See text accompanying 
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Corwin justly concluded, "Clearly, what Marshall had foremost in 
mind was simply the President's role as instrument of communica-
tion with other governments."85 Stripped of later interpretive en-
crustations, Marshall merely affirmed that a demand for extradition 
under a treaty "can only be made upon" the President; and that he 
is free to fashion his own means of complying with the treaty and 
demand until Congress "prescribes the mode." Far from excluding 
Congress from this "sole organ" area, therefore, Marshall regarded 
the exercise of even this power as subject to congressional control. 
E. Hamilton's Later Views 
Corwin attributes the expansion of the "President's external 
role ... in the first instance" to Hamilton, through the medium 
of his "Pacificus" papers in 1793.86 Madison entered the lists under 
the nom de plume "Helvidius"; and John Quincy Adams remarked 
in 1836 that Madison "scrutinized the doctrines of Pacificus with an 
acuteness of intellect never perhaps surpassed," and that his "most 
forcible arguments are pointed with quotations from the papers of 
The Federalist written by Mr. Hamilton."87 But "history," said 
Corwin, "has awarded the palm of victory to 'Pacificus,' " meaning 
that "[b]y his reading of the 'executive power' clause 'Pacificus' gave 
the President constitutional warrant to go ahead and apply the ad-
vantages of his position in a field of power to which they are specially 
adapted."88 That "Pacificus'" views were congenial to presidential 
note 55 supra. No "tradition of executive power" can diminish the constitutional 
provisions nor defeat the intention of the Founders. 
Corwin, id. at 39, likewise relied on a Marshall dictum in Marbury v. Madison, 5 
U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 165-66 (1803), to bolster the "discretion" of the President "as 
the organ of communication." Marshall pointed to the act of Congress for establishing 
the department of foreign affairs, and said of the Secretary, "This officer, as his duties 
were prescribed by that act, is to conform precisely to the will of the President." 
(Emphasis added.) It was the President's statutory control of the Secretary in the 
frame of judicial review that was under discussion, not his total freedom from con• 
gressional control. Congress could of course repeal the act; it could not permanently 
abdicate the powers confided to it, as Corwin himself noted. CoRWIN, THE PRESIDENT, 
supra note 6, at 9. And as we noted, Marshall himself recognized the overriding power 
of Congress even with respect to the President's sole power of communication. 
85. CoRWIN, THE PRESIDENT, supra note 6, at 216 (emphasis original). Earlier, 
CoRWIN, CoNTRoL, supra note 28, at 102, he took exception to Marshall's assertion that 
"Congress may unquestionably prescribe the mode • • • ." But if the Marshall 
statement is to undergird presidential claims, it must be read entire, limited as 
Marshall confined it. Corwin recognizes that by Act of Congress, "complaints for 
extradition may be lodged with any court of record," but maintains that "the final act 
of surrender still rests with the discretion of the President." CORWIN, CoNTRoL, supra, 
at 103. That exclusive enclave is small indeed. 
86. CoRWIN, THE PRESIDENT, supra note 6, at 217. 
87. Id. at 219, 466 n.34, quoting J.Q • .ADAMS, EULOGY ON JAMES MADISON 46 (1836). 
88. CORWIN, TOTAL WAR, supra note 5, at 12. 
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expansionism is hardly deniable; but whether they afforded a "con-
stitutional warrant" must tum on the validity of his arguments 
rather than their subsequent adoption by Presidents whose purposes 
they served. For, as Lord Justice Denman stated, "the mere state-
ment and restatement of a doctrine ... cannot make it law, unless it 
can be traced to some competent authority."89 The magic of Hamil-
ton's name must not obscure the fact that he had executed a volte-
/ace, repudiating assurances he had made both in The Federalist and 
in the New York Ratification Convention to procure adoption of the 
Constitution. 
To still objections to the exclusive presidential power to "receive 
Ambassadors"-the sole foreign affairs power confided to the Presi-
dent alone-Hamilton had earlier assured the people that it "is 
more a matter of dignity than of authority . . . without conse-
quence."90 Now, as "Pacificus," he transformed this innocuous 
"dignity" into "the right of the executive to decide upon the obliga-
tions of the country with regard to foreign nations," so that had there 
been an "ofjensive and defensive" treaty with France, presidential 
recognition "of the new government ... would have laid the Legis-
lature under an obligation ... of exercising its power of declaring 
war."91 The "story as a whole," Corwin observes, "only emphasizes 
the essential truth of 'Helvidius' ' contention that 'Pacificus' ' read-
ing of the executive power clause contravened, certainly in effect, 
the express intention of the Constitution that the war-declaring 
power [plus discretion when to exercise it] should lodge with the 
legislative authority."92 
Hamilton also built upon the contrast between Article I, which 
provides that "all legislative powers herein granted shall be vested 
in a Congress," and Article II, which declares that "the Executive 
89. O'Connell v. Regina, 8 Eng. Rep. 1061, 1143 (1844). Maitland too stated that 
"some statement about the 13th century does not become true because it has been 
constantly repeated, that a 'chain of testimony' is never stronger than its first link." 
Quoted in C. FIFOOT, FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND: A LIFE 11 (1971). 
90. See note 21 supra and accompanying text. 
91. 4 A. HAMILTON, THE WORKS OF Af.EXANDER HAMILTON 442 (H. Lodge ed. 1904) 
(emphasis original). With good reason, therefore, did Madison say that the reception 
clause merely provided "for a particular mode of communication ••• for the ceremony 
of admitting public ministers, of examining their credentials, and of authenticating 
their title," so that "it would be highly improper to magnify the function into an im-
portant prerogative •.•• " 6 J. MADISON, THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 162 (G. Hunt 
ed. 1906). "So visionary a prophet,'' said Madison, as would have foretold in 1788 
that Hamilton would in 1793 elevate an admittedly inconsequential power to that of 
imposing on Congress an obligation to declare war, would not have been believed. Id. 
at 162-63. 
92. CORWIN, TOTAL WAR, supra note 5, at 14. See generally Berger, War-Making, 
supra note 17. 
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power shall be vested in a President," brushing aside the enumera-
tion of specific presidential powers that followed as not "derogating 
from the more comprehensive grant in the general clause."93 Al-
though the vast bulk of powers granted by the Constitution are con-
ferred upon Congress, it is the President, according to Hamilton, 
who emerges with all but unlimited power. 
His view is refuted by the historical record. The colonial period, 
Corwin said, "ended with the belief prevalent that 'the executive 
magistracy' was the natural enemy, the legislative assembly the nat-
ural friend of liberty .... "94' In considerable part, this belief was an 
outgrowth of the fact that assemblies were elected by the colonists 
themselves whereas the governors were placed over them by the 
King.911 In "most of the early state constitutions accordingly we find 
the gubernatorial office reduced almost to the dimensions of a sym-
bol," with all roots in the royal prerogative cut.96 Charles Warren 
thought it 
probable that Madison and Randolph in preparing the Virginia 
Plan had in mind the conception of Executive power which Thomas 
Jefferson had set forth in his Draft of a Fundamental Constitution 
for Virginia in 1783, as follows: " .... By Executive powers, we 
mean no reference to those powers exercised under our former gov-
ernment by the Crown as of its prerogative .... We give them these 
powers only, which are necessary to execute the laws (and administer 
the government) .... "97 
The Virginia Plan, submitted to the Convention by Governor 
Edmund Randolph, proposed a "national executive ... with power· 
93. 4 A. HAMILTON, supra note 91, at 438-39. For materials tracing the path to 
the words "executive power" see Berger, Privilege, supra note 73, at 1072-73. 
94. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT, supra note 6, at 4. Those who fashioned the States, said 
Madison, "seem never for a moment to have turned their eyes from the danger to 
liberty from the overgrown and all-grasping prerogative of an hereditary magistrate." 
THE FEDERALisr No. 48, supra note 21, at 322. 
95. I J. WILSON, THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 292-93 (R. McCloskey ed. 1967). 
96. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT, supra note 6, at 4-5. For example, the Virginia Con-
stitution of 1776 provides that the Governor shall "exercise the executive powers of 
government, according to the laws of this Commonwealth, and shall not, under any 
pretence, exercise any power or prerogative, by virtue of any law, statute, or custom 
of England." 2 B. POORE, FEDERAL AND STATE CoNsrrrUTIONS 1910-11 (1877). Section 33 
of the Maryland Constitution of 1776 is almost identical. I B. PooRE, supra, at 825. 
CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT, supra note 6, at 5, justifiably concludes that under the pre-
Convention state constitutions, "Executive power ••• was cut off entirely from the 
resources of the common law and of English constitutional usage." In the Convention, 
James 'Wilson stated that he "did not consider the Prerogatives of the British monarch 
as a proper guide in defining the Executive powers." I M. FARRAND, supra note 30, at 
65-66. Hamilton emphasized in THE FEDERALisr No. 69, supra note 21, at 448, that the 
President's authority as Commander in Chief would be "much inferior" to that of the 
British King. See also note Ill infra. 
97. C. WARREN, THE MAK.ING OF THE CoNsrlTUTION 177 (1947). 
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to carry into execution the national laws-to appoint to offices, in 
cases not otherwise provided for .... "98 Roger Sherman "considered 
the Executive magistracy as nothing more than an institution for 
carrying the will of the Legislature into effect . . . .''99 Although 
James Wilson was the "leader of the 'strong executive' party,"100 the 
"only powers he conceived strictly Executive were those of execut-
ing the laws, and appointing officers . . . ."101 Madison emphasized 
that preliminarily it was essential "to fix the extent of the Executive 
authority ... as certain powers were in their nature Executive, and 
must be given to that department ... .'' And he added that the execu-
tive powers "shd. be confined and defined.''102 Thereafter, the enu-
merated powers were slowly added.1°8 
The explanation of executive power to the Ratifying Conven-
tions reaffirmed these views. The executive powers were "precisely 
those of the governors," said James Bowdoin in Massachusetts, as did 
James Iredell in North Carolina.104 "What are his powers?" said 
Governor Randolph in Virginia. "To see the laws executed. Every 
executive in America has that power.''105 In Pennsylvania, James 
Wilson, in order to defend the President against the charge that he 
"will be the tool of the Senate," pointed first to the fact that he was 
to be Commander in Chief, and then added, "There is another power 
of no small magnitude intrusted to this officer. 'He shall take care 
that the laws be faithfully executed.' "106 Iredell likewise stressed 
that the "office of superintending the execution of the laws ... is 
... of the utmost importance";107 and this was likewise the view 
expressed in North Carolina by Archibald Maclaine.108 Charles 
Pinckney, a Framer, said in South Carolina that "[h]is duties, will 
98. 1 M. FARRAND, supra note 30, at 62-63. For approval by the Convention on 
July 17th, see 2 id. at 32-33. 
99. 1 id. at 65. 
100. CORWIN, Tm: PRl1.SIDENT, supra note 6, at 11. 
101. 1 M. FARRAND, supra note 30, at 66. 
102. 1 id. at 66-67 (emphasis added). King's notes recorded: "Mad: agrees with 
Wilson in his definition of executive powers-executive powers ex vi termini, do not 
include the Rights of war and peace, &:c. but the powers shd. be confined and defined-
if large we shall have the Evils of elective Monarchies •••• " Id. at 70. See also Berger, 
Privilege, supra note 73, at 1071-75. 
103. Cf. CORWIN, THE PRl1.SIDENT, supra note 6, at 11-12. 
104. 2 J. ELLIOT, supra note 30, at 128; 4 id. at 107. For the governors' powers, see 
note 96 supra and accompanying text. 
105. 3 J. ELLIOT, supra note 30, at 201. 
106. 2 id. at 512-13. 
107. 4 id. 106, 136. 
108. Id. at 136. 
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be, to attend to the execution of the acts of Congress";109 and, to 
ward off fears of "the dangers of the executive," Pinckney stressed 
that the President cannot "take a single step in his government, 
without [Senate] advice."110 Another Framer, William Davie, told 
the North Carolina Convention that "that jealousy of executive 
power which has shown itself so strongly in all American govern-
ments, would not admit" of lodging the treaty powers in the Presi-
dent alone. 111 
Hamilton's own representations in the several numbers of The 
Federalist devoted to analysis of presidential powers did not part 
company with the Framers. Public sentiment would not permit it. 
"Calculating upon the aversion of the people to monarchy," he 
wrote, opponents of the Constitution "have endeavoured to enlist 
all their jealousies and apprehensions in opposition to the intended 
President ... as the full-grown progeny of that detested parent."112 
To counter such fears, he launched upon a minute analysis of each 
of the enumerated powers; for example, the Commander in Chief 
was merely to be the "first General."113 Nothing was "to be feared," 
from an executive "with the confined authorities" of the President.114 
And after thus enumerating several powers, Hamilton stated: 
The only remaining powers of the Executive are comprehended in 
giving information to Congress of the state of the Union; in recom-
mending to their consideration such measures as he shall judge ex-
pedient; in convening them, or either branch, upon extraordinary 
occasions; in adjourning them when they cannot themselves agree 
upon the time of adjournment; in receiving ambassadors and other 
public ministers; in faithfully executing the laws; and in commis-
sioning all the officers of the United States.115 
When "Paci.ficus" shifted gears, he too lightly dismissed the effect 
of the enumeration of powers; for the Founders were repeatedly 
assured that there was little risk of oppression under "a government 
consisting of enumerated powers."116 Governor Randolph said in the 
109. 3 M. FARRAND, supra note 30, at 111. 
110. 4 J. Er.uoT, supra note 30, at 258. 
111. Id. at 120. "Fear of a return of Executive authority like that exercised by the 
Royal Governors or by the King had been ever present in the states from the beginning 
of the Revolution." C. WARREN, supra note 97, at 173. 
112. THE FEDERALIST No. 67, supra note 21, at 436. 
113. THE FEDERALisr No. 69, id. at 448. 
114. THE FEDERALIST No. 71, id. at 468. 
115. THE FEDERALIST No. 77, id. at 501 (emphasis added). 
116. James Wilson in 2 J. EWOT, supra note 30, at 436. 
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Virginia Convention that the powers of government "are enumer-
ated. Is it not, then, fairly deductible, that it has no power but what 
is expressly given it?-for if its powers were to be general, an enu-
meration would be needless."117 James Iredell told the North Caro-
lina Convention, "It is necessary to particularize the powers intended 
to be given, in the Constitution, as having no existence before; but, 
after having enumerated what we give up, it follows . . . that what-
ever is done, by virtue of that authority, is legal .... "118 It will be 
recalled that Madison stated in the Federal Convention that it was 
essential "to fix the extent of the Executive authority" and to give 
"certain powers" to the executive, and that the executive power 
should be "confined and defined."119 The Federalist itself, per Madi-
son, emphasized in No. 14 that the jurisdiction of the federal gov-
ernment "is limited to certain enumerated objects,"120 and in No. 
45 that "[t]he powers delegated ... to the federal government are 
few and defined.''121 What Lee said in Virginia of Congress could 
equally have been said of the President: "[T]he liberties of the 
people are secure. . . . When a question arises with respect to the 
legality of any power, exercised or assumed by Congress [the ques-
tion will be] ... Is it enumerated in the Constitution? . • . It is 
otherwise arbitrary and unconstitutional.''122 
These were not the only departures by "Pacificus" from Hamil-
ton's prior representations. Having erected a plenary executive 
power, "Pacificus" proceeded to whittle down "participation of the 
Senate in the making of treaties, and the power of the legislature to 
declare war" because "as exceptions out of the general 'executive 
power' vested in the President, they are to be construed strictly 
••• .''123 Not only does this run counter to the last-minute joinder 
of the President as a participant in the treaty power, but Hamilton 
117. 3 id. at 464. 
118. 4 id. at 179. Chief Justice Taney pointed out how "carefully" the Framers 
withheld from the executive branch "many of the powers belonging to the executive 
English government ••• and conferred ••• those powers only which were deemed 
essential." Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144, 149 (No. 9487) (C.C. Md. 1861). So too, 
Story stated that the powers with which the executive branch "is entrusted ••• are 
enumerated in the second and third sections •••• " 2 J. STORY, CoMMENTAIUES ON THE 
CoNSTlTUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1489, at 327 (5th ed. 1891). 
119. See text accompanying note 102 supra. 
120. THE FEDERALisr No. 14, supra note 21, at 82. 
121. THE FEDERALisr No. 45, id. at 303. For additional citations, see BERGER, CON-
GRESS, supra note 32, at 13-14, 377 n.52. 
122. 3 J. ELLIOT, supra note 30, at 186 (emphasis original). Iredell said of the Su-
premacy Clause in the North Carolina Convention, "[f]he question ••• will always 
be, whether Congress had exceeded its authority." 4 id. at 179. 
123. 4 A. HAMILTON, supra note 91, at 443. 
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himself had stated in The Federalist No. 75 that the treaty power 
"partake[s] more of the legislative than of the executive character, 
though it does not seem strictly to fall within the definition of either 
of them."12t Wilson and Madison stated in the Convention that 
some of the King's prerogatives "were of a Legislative nature. Among 
others that of war & peace"; and consequently those prerogatives 
were not "a proper guide in defining the Executive powers." The 
"only powers" they considered "strictly Executive were those of 
executing the laws, and appointing officers not appointed by the 
Legislature."125 Later, Wilson stated that in the distribution of war 
powers all of the powers "naturally connected" with Congress' power 
to "declare war" were confided to it, leaving to the President only 
the direction of the armed forces once war was commenced by Con-
gress or by foreign invasion.126 If there was an "exception," it ran 
the other way, from the plenary war-making power of Congress 
for the executive £unction of "first General." So too, the treaty power, 
which was lodged in the Senate almost to the end of the Convention, 
and only then altered to admit presidential participation, hardly 
reflects a view that it is executive in nature.127 
124. THE FEDERALisr No. 75, supra note 21, at 486. 
125. 1 M. FARRAND, supra note 30, at 65-66, 70. 
126. 1 J. WILSON, supra note 95, at 433, 440. For extended discussion, see generally 
Berger, War-Making, supra note 17. 
127. In his "Helvidius" papers, Madison reasons, 
The natural province of the executive magistrate is to execute laws, as that of 
the legislature is to make laws. All his acts, therefore, properly executive, must 
presuppose the existence of laws to be executed. A treaty is not an execution of 
laws: it does not presuppose the existence of laws. It is, on the contrary, to have 
itself the force of a law, and to be carried into execution, like all other laws, 
by the executive magistrate. To say that the power of making treaties, which 
are confessedly laws, belongs naturally to the department which is to execute it, 
is to say that the executive department naturally includes a legislative power. 
In theory this is an absurdity-in practice a tyranny. 
6 J. MADISON, supra note 91, at 145 (emphasis original). After serving as Secretary of 
State, Vice President Jefferson wrote in his MANUAL OF PARLIAMENTARY PRAGrICE § 52, 
at 109 (Clark, Austin &: Smith ed. 1856): "Treaties are legislative acts." 
Corwin considers that Madison's view is inconsistent with his position during the 
"removal" debate in 1789. CORWIN, CONTROL, supra note 28, at 28-29. If Madison's 
1789 views were inconsistent with the views he later expressed, the latter were con-
sistent with the statements that are an index to construction of the Constitution. See 
BERGER, CONGRESS, supra note 32, at 76-81. 
Then too, the issues were entirely different. The Constitution made no provision 
for removal from office, and there was no explanation by the Framers. Hence when 
Madison and others argued that the power ought to be in the Executive, they con-
tradicted neither the express terms of the Constitution nor its history. Hamilton, 
however, did contradict the evident assumption writ large in the text that "the Presi-
dent and the Senate will be associated throughout the entire process of making a treaty 
... .'' See text accompanying note 29 supra. And in his subsequent Letters of Camillus, 
Hamilton stated that because of the "most ample latitude" of the treaty power "it was 
carefully guarded; the cooperation of • • • the Senate . • • being required to make any 
treaty whatever." 6 A. HAMILTON, supra note 91, at 183. 
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After his "Pacificus" papers, Hamilton wrote in his Letters of 
Camillus that "the organization of the power of treaty in the Con-
stitution was attacked and defended with an admission on both 
sides, of its being of the [legislative] character which I have assigned 
to it. Its great extent and importance . . . the legislative authority 
were mutually taken for granted .... "128 
Of course, Hamilton was free to change his mind from time to 
time; but the meaning of the Constitution, as Jefferson stressed, is 
"to be found in the explanations of those who advocated it," upon 
which the people relied in adopting the Constitution.128 Until the 
people are given the chance to say whether they have changed their 
minds, Hamilton's shift can furnish no "constitutional warrant" for 
an unconfined executive power. 
"Pacificus' " view that the general executive power was not re-
stricted by the specifically enumerated powers that followed was 
embraced by Chief Justice Taft in Myers v. United States180 over the 
dissents of Justices Holmes131 and Brandeis,132 who gave short shrift 
to the executive power argument.133 Not Taft's views, but those of 
Holmes and Brandeis subsequently prevailed with Justices Black, 
Douglas, Frankfurter and Jackson in Youngstown Sheet b Tube Co. 
v. Sawyer.134 Justice Jackson rejected the view that the executive 
power clause "is a grant in bulk of all conceivable executive power 
but regard[ ed] it as an allocation to the presidential office of the 
generic powers thereafter stated."135 Which view the newly recon-
128. 6 A. HAMILTON, supra note 91, at 185. In this letter Hamilton cited the dissent 
of George Mason from the Constitution on the ground that "[b)y declaring all treaties 
supreme laws of the land, the Executive and Senate have, in many cases, an exclusive 
power of legislation • • • ."; and he comments, "This shows the great extent of the 
power, in the conception of Mr. Mason: in many cases amounting to an exclusive power 
of legislation: nor did he object to the ex.tent •••• " Id. at 184 (emphasis original). 
129. Quoted in 4 J. ELLIOT, supra note 30, at 446. So too, Madison clung "to the 
sense in which the Constitution was accepted and ratified by the Nation •••• And if 
that be not the guide in ex.pounding it, there can be no security for a consistent and 
stable government, more than for a faithful exercise of its powers." 9 J. MADISON, 
supra note 91, at 191. 
130. 272 U.S. 52, 118, 128 (1925). 
131. 272 U.S. at 177. 
132. 272 U.S. at 244-47. 
133. For a discussion, see Berger, Privilege, supra note 73, at 1073-76. McDougal &: 
Lans, supra note 5, at 252, rely on Myers for the "construction of the first clause of 
Article II as a broad grant of residual power to the executive." See also McDougal &: 
Lans, supra, at 295. In his 1953 edition of the Constitution, supra note 1, at 379, 
Corwin stated, "These enlarged conceptions of the executive power clause have been 
ratified by the Supreme Court" in the Myers case. 
134. 343 U.S. 579, 587 (Black, J.), 610 (Frankfurter, J.), 641 (Jackson, J.) (1952). 
Justice Douglas stated: "Article II which vests the 'executive Power' in the President 
defines that power with particularity." 343 U.S. at 632. 
135. 343 U.S. at 641. 
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structed Burger Court may opt for is an open question; but it cannot 
rewrite history. And it is the unmistakable lesson of history that the 
President was intentionally given a few enumerated powers, no more. 
F. The 1816 Senate Report 
Another hardy perennial frequently drawn forth in defense of 
presidential monopoly-by Justice Sutherland136 and Dean Ache-
son137 among others-is an 1816 Report by the Senate Committee 
on Foreign Relations, which counseled against "interference of the 
Senate in the direction of foreign negotiations."138 This warning was 
based on notions of expediency, as to which men may differ, rather 
than upon the historical content of the treaty power. Opposed to this 
Report is a Senate debate in 1806, which discloses that the Senate 
then "believed that, constitutionally, it possessed authority to par-
ticipate in treaty-making at any stage in the process,"139 a belief later 
shared by Secretary of State Buchanan and President Polk.140 A more 
important episode is the statement in the Senate by Senator Rufus 
King in 1818. King had been a member of the Continental Congress, 
of the Federal Convention where, as a member of the Committee on 
Detail, he helped draft the final provision for presidential partici-
pation in treaty-making, of the Massachusetts Ratification Conven-
tion, and of the Senate quadrumvirate, which piloted the Jay Treaty 
from beginning to end. Said King, 
[I]n respect to foreign affairs, the President has no exclusive binding 
power, except that of receiving Ambassadors . . • . [T]o the validity 
of all other definitive proceedings in the management of the foreign 
affairs, the Constitutional advice and consent of the Senate are in-
dispensable ..•. [I]n this capacity the Senate may, and ought to, look 
into and watch over every branch of the foreign affairs . . . they 
may, therefore, at any time call for full and exact information re-
specting the foreign affairs .... To make a treaty includes all the 
proceedings by which it is made; and the advice and consent of the 
Senate being necessary in the making of treaties, must necessarily be 
so, touching the measures employed in making the same.141 
King rejected the gloss "that the President shall make treaties, and 
136, United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936). See text 
accompanying note 19 supra. 
137, Hearings, supra note 13, at 260. The Report was also cited by Assistant Attor-
ney General William H. Rehnquist, id. at 431. 
138. Quoted in 299 U.S. at 319; Hearings, supra note 13, at 260. 
139. R. HAYDEN, supra note 23, at 203, 199-203. 
140. See Black, supra note 70, at 7-8. 
141, 31 ANNALS OF CONG. 106-07 (1818). 
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by and with the consent of the Senate ratify the same."142 Great 
weight attaches to his explanation, not merely because "he was 
there," but because it faithfully corresponds to the view that was 
taken of the treaty power by the Framers, the Ratifiers, and by 
President Washington. 
G. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation: 
Inherent Presidential Power 
It remained for our time to furnish a powerful impetus to presi-
dential expansionism in the shape of some ill-considered dicta in 
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation, per Justice 
Sutherland,143 to which the Court lent credit in United States v. 
Pink.144 Despite searching criticism,145 Curtiss-Wright has become 
the foundation of subsequent decisions and has all too frequently 
been cited for an omnipresent presidential power over foreign rela-
tions. The case proceeded from a Joint Resolution which authorized 
the President, upon making certain findings and engaging in con-
sultations with other American Republics, to declare unlawful the 
sale of munitions to countries then engaged in armed conflict in the 
Chaco, namely Bolivia and Paraguay, if it "may contribute to the 
reestablishment of peace between those countries."146 The sole issue 
was whether this was an improper delegation,147 a question that 
might adequately have been answered under the Field v. Clark148 
line of cases. But the aims of Justice Sutherland soared beyond this 
modest goal; he would launch a theory of inherent presidential 
power over foreign relations.149 To this end he confined the enumer-
ation of powers doctrine to "domestic or internal affairs";150 in for-
142. Id. Compare text accompanying notes 22-23 supra. 
143. See text accompanying note 19 supra. 
144. 315 U.S. 203, 229 (1942). The Curtiss-Wright dicta were brushed aside in 
Youngstown Sheet &: Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-36 &: n.2 (1952), by Justice 
Jackson, who pointed out that Curtiss-Wright "involved, not the question of the Presi-
dent's power to act without congressional authority, but the question of his right to 
act under and in accord with an act of Congress." (Concurring opinion.) 
145. See note 180 infra. See also Kurland, The Impotence of Reticence, 1968 DUKE 
L.J. 619, 622-23. 
146. 299 U.S. at 312. 
147. 299 U.S. at 315. 
148. 143 U.S. 649 (1892). See also J. W. Hampton, Jr.,&: Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 
394 (1928). The cases are well analyzed in W. GELLHORN &: C. BYSE, ADMINismATIVE 
LAw: CASES AND COMMENTS 48-52 (5th ed. 1970). 
149. As late as 1929, Willoughby wrote, "There can be no question as to the uncon-
stitutional unsoundness, as well as the revolutionary character of the theory" of 
inherent powers. 1 w. WILLOUGHBY, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
92 (2d ed. 1929). 
150. 299 U.S. at 315-16. 
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eign affairs, he explained, in terms recalling the descent of the Holy 
Ghost, "the external sovereignty of Great Britain . . . immediately 
passed to the Union."151 In this he was deceived. It hardly needs 
more than Madison's statement in The Federalist No. 45, that "[t]he 
powers delegated by the proposed Constitution are few and defined 
... [they] will be exercised principally on external objects, as war, 
peace, negotiation, and foreign commerce,''152 to prove that the pow-
ers over foreign relations were enumerated and "defined." Deferring 
for the moment further comment on Sutherland's aberrant theory, 
let it be assumed that somehow the nation or Union obtained "in-
herent" powers over foreign relations, and it still needs to be shown 
how the power came to be vested in the President. For, as Justice 
Frankfurter pointed out, "the fact that power exists in the Govern-
ment does not vest it in the President."153 The "inherent power" 
theory, moreover, would circumvent the manifest intention of the 
Framers to create a federal government of limited and enumerated 
powers and defeat their purpose to condition presidential action in 
the field of foreign relations on congressional participation. Before 
examining the history Sutherland avouched, another ground of his 
opinion should be noticed: the "plenary and exclusive power of the 
President as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of 
international relations," for which he trotted out Marshall's "sole 
organ" dictum and the Senate Committee Report of 1816,154 earlier 
discussed. 
McDougal and Lans, who relied heavily on these dicta,m ac-
knowledged that Sutherland's analysis "unquestionably involves cer-
tain metaphorical elements and considerable differences of opinion 
about historical facts," but concluded that he "may have been ex-
pressing a thought more profound than any involved in quarrels 
about the naming of powers."156 This is to conclude that Suther-
land was right for the wrong reasons. Apparently the "profound" 
thought was the "important fact ... that the imperatives of survival 
151. 299 U.S. at 317. 
152. THE FEDERALIST No. 45, supra note 21, at 303 (emphasis added). 
153. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 604 (1952) (concurring 
opinion). 
154. 299 U.S. at 319-20. 
155. McDougal & Lans, supra note 5, at 255-58. Dean Acheson, former Secretary 
of State, cited Curtiss-Wright to the Senate in July 1971. Hearings, supra note 13, at 
260,264. 
156. McDougal &: Lans, supra note 5, at 257-58. The Framers, we shall see, would 
have no part of his metaphors. 
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have required the Federal Government to exercise certain powers."1157 
No "imperatives of survival" were at stake in Curtiss-Wright or in 
Pink, nor has there been any demonstration that the powers of the 
federal government were and are inadequate, still less how supra-
constitutional powers came to rest in the President. Instead, the issue 
is whether the President may act without the participation of the 
Senate in the exercise of powers conferred on President and Senate 
jointly. The "quarrel," therefore, is not about the mere "naming of 
powers," but about presidential claims to exclusive power notwith-
standing that the Constitution and Founders unmistakably meant 
the treaty power to be exercised jointly with the Senate. 
It is high time that the mischievous and demonstrably wrong 
dicta of Justice Sutherland be put to rest. His view that the President 
enjoys extra-constitutional powers outside the sphere of enumerated 
powers was based on the theory that 
since the states severally never possessed international powers, such 
powers could not have been carved from the mass of state powers but 
obviously were transmitted to the United States from some other 
source . . . • [T]he powers of external sovereignty passed from the 
Crown not to the colonies severally, but to the colonies in their col-
lective and corporate capacity as the United States .... Sovereignty 
is never held in suspense. When, therefore, the external sovereignty 
of Great Britain in respect of the colonies ceased, it immediately 
passed to the Union. See Penhallow v. Doane, 3 Dall. 54, 80-81.1158 
Seldom have dicta more "obviously" been removed from the histori-
cal facts. 
To the minds of the colonists, "thirteen sovereignties," as Chief 
Justice Jay said in 1793, "were considered as emerged from the prin-
ciples of the revolution."159 For this we need go no further than the 
Articles of Confederation, agreed to by the Continental Congress on 
November 5, 1777, signed by all the States save Maryland in 1778 
and 1779, and ratified March 1, 1781.160 Article II recited, "Each 
state retains its sovereignty, freedom and independence, and every 
Power ... which is not ... expressly delegated to the United States 
157. Id. This reasoning is followed by Mathews, The Constitutional Power of the 
President To Conclude International Agreements, 64 YALE L.J. 345, 348 (1955). 
158. 299 U.S. at 316-17. 
159. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 470 (1793). The Massachusetts Con-
stitution of 1780, art. IV, provided, "The people of this commonwealth have the sole 
and exclusive right of governing themselves as a free, sovereign, and independent 
State, and do, and forever hereafter shall, exercise and enjoy every power, jurisdiction 
and right which is not, or may not hereafter be, by them expressly delegated to the 
United States of America in Congress assembled." 1 B. PooRE, supra note 96, at 958, 
160. H. CoMMAGER, DOCUl',IENTS OF AMERICAN HISI'ORY Ill (7th ed. 1963). 
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in Congress assembled." Article III provided, "The said states hereby 
severally enter into a firm league of friendship with each other, for 
their common defence .... " Mark that they entered into a "league"; 
they did not purport to create a "corporate" or "sovereign" body. 
Article IX then declared that "[t]he united states in congress assem-
bled shall have the sole and exclusive right of determining on 
peace and war ... entering into treaties and alliances." This express 
grant of war and treaty powers alone undermines Justice Suther-
land's central premise that these powers were derived from "some 
other source" than the several States. If the new-horn Continental 
Congress possessed "inherent" war and treaty powers from the out-
set, the express grant was gratuitous. 
Nor did the Founders share Justice Sutherland's views on sover-
eignty. More pragmatic than he, they spoke, not in terms of sover-
eignty, hut of power; and they were quite clear that the people, not 
even the cherished States, were sovereign. Power flowed from the 
people, not from the Crown to fill a vacuum. Hear James Iredell 
in North Carolina: "It is necessary to particularize the power in-
tended to be given, as having no existence before .... "161 "The 
people," stated Madison in the Convention, "were in fact the foun-
tain of all power";162 a part they conferred upon the individual 
States; and in the clause, "We, the people of the United States ... 
do ordain and establish this Constitution," said Chief Justice Jay, 
"we see the people acting as sovereign of the whole country."163 
Sovereignty was taken by the people to themselves. 
When Justice Sutherland cited Penhallow v. Doane,164 he re-
ferred solely to the opinion of Justice William Paterson, ignoring 
the fact that the majority opinions of Justices Iredell and Cushing 
were to the contrary. The case arose on a state of facts that antedated 
the adoption of the Articles of Confederation; and Paterson stated 
that the Continental Congress exercised the "rights and powers 
of war," and that "states individually did not."165 This, however, 
does not tell the whole story. For example, the Continental Congress 
resolved on November 4, 1775, 
161. 4 J. ELLIOT, supra note 30, at 179 (emphasis added). 
162. 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 30, at 476. For similar remarks by George Mason, 
James Iredell, James Wilson, and others, see BERGER, CONGRESS, supra note 32, 173 n. 
99, 174-75. With justice, therefore, did Professor P.B. Kurland dismiss Justice Suther-
land's "discovery" that "the presidential powers over foreign affairs derived not at all 
from the Constitution but rather from the Crown of England." Kurland, supra note 
145, at 622, See also note 183 infra. 
163. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 471 (1793). 
164. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 54 (1795). 
165. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 80-81. 
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[t]hat the town of Charleston ought to be defended against any at-
tempts that may be made to take possession thereof by the enemies of 
America, and that the convention or council of safety of South Caro-
lina, ought to pursue such measures, as to them shall seem most effi-
cacious for the purpose, and that they proceed immediately to erect 
such fortifications and batteries in or near Charleston, as will best 
conduce to promote its security, the expence to be paid by said 
Colony.166 
Other testimony that each of the Colonies was thought to possess 
war-making power is furnished by the July 12, 1776, draft of the 
Articles of Confederation: "The said Colonies unite themselves . . . 
and hereby severally enter into a firm League of Friendship . . . 
binding the said Colonies to assist one another against all Force 
offered to or attacks made upon them .... "167 Indeed, as Justice Chase 
was to remark in a cognate case, the very fact of delegation of war 
power by the States to the Congress demonstrates that the States must 
have "rightfully possessed" it.168 In the course of time, the States 
did not "individually" exercise the power of war; but that did not 
spring from absence of original power but from a voluntary sur-
render expressed both in the Article IX delegation and in the 1776 
draft of Article XIII: "No colony ... shall engage in any War with-
out the previous Consent of the United States assembled, .. .''169-a 
provision that was preserved in Article VI of the Articles as adopted. 
Justice James Iredell, whose opinion in Penhallow went un-
noticed by Sutherland, understood all this full well. Each province, 
he pointed out, had comprised "a body politic," in nowise connected 
with the others "than as being subject to the same common sover-
eign."170 "If congress," he continued, "previous to the articles of 
confederation, possessed any authority, it was an authority . . . 
derived from the people of each Province .... [T]his authority was 
conveyed by each body politic separately, and not by all the people 
in the several provinces, or states, jointly .... "171 And he concluded 
that the war-making authority "was not possessed by Congress, unless 
given by all the states."172 In this view he was joined by Justice Wil-
166. 3 JoUR. CoNTL. CoNG. 326 (1775). 
167. 5 JoUR. CoNTL. CONG. 546-47 (1776). 
168. "Virginia had a right, as a sovereign and independent nation, to confiscate 
any British property within its territory, unless she had delegated that power to 
Congress . • • . [I]f she had before parted with such power, it must be conceded, that 
she once rightfully possessed it." Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 231 (1796). 
169. 5 JoUR. CoNTL. CoNG. 549 (1776); H. CoMMAGER, supra note 160, at 112. 
170. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 90. 
171. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 92-94. 
172. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 95. 
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liam Cushing;173 and both are abundantly confirmed by the specific 
grants of war and treaty powers to the Congress in the Articles of 
Confederation. 
Reliance for "inherent" war and treaty powers antedating the 
Articles of Confederation has also been placed174 upon some remarks 
by Justice Chase in Ware v. Hylton: 175 "The powers of congress 
originated from necessity . . . they were revolutionary in their very 
nature . . . . It was absolutely and indispensably necessary that 
Congress should possess the power of conducting the war against 
Great Britain, and therefore, if not expressly given by all, (as it was 
by some of the States [who had ratified the Articles in 1778]) ... 
Congress did rightfully possess such power."176 A simpler and more 
prosaic explanation is at hand. Sitting and working together, 
the delegates from the thirteen States-who as early as July 1776 
proposed in the draft Articles of Confederation to reduce to writing 
the necessary delegation by the States to Congress and who agreed 
to the Articles of Confederation in November 1777-presumably 
were agreed that the conduct of the war required centralization and 
therefore authorized the necessary "confederated" acts pending for-
mal adoption of the proposed Articles. Roughly that view was taken 
by Iredell, one of the great Founders, who led the struggle for adop-
tion of the Constitution in North Carolina.177 
The invocation of the treaty signed ·with France by Benjamin 
Franklin and his fellow commissioners in February 1778, and rati-
fied by Congress in May,178 little advances the argument for 
"inherent" national power. Franklin and the other commissioners 
proceeded to France under express instructions to enter into a 
treaty with the King of France, carrying with them "letters of 
credence" (September 1776), running not from the Congress but 
from "The delegates of the United States of New Hampshire, 
Massachusetts Bay," and each of the other enumerated States.179 
173. Justice Cushing stated: "I have no doubt of the sovereignty of the states, 
saving the powers delegated to Congress • . • to carry on, unitedly, the common 
defense in the open war •••• " 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 117. 
174. McDougal 8: I.ans, supra note 5, at 258. 
175. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796). 
176. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 232 (emphasis original). 
177. Despite his statement respecting "revolutionary" "necessity," Justice Chase 
himself stated in Ware v. Hylton that "all the powers actually exercised by congress, 
before (the confederation], were rightfully exercised, on the presumption not to be 
controverted, that they were so authorized by the people they represented, by an 
express or implied grant ••.• " 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 232. 
178. See McDougal 8: Lans, supra note 5, at 258; II JoUR. CoNTL. CONG. 421, 444, 
457 (1778). 
179. 5 JoUR. CoNTL. CONG. 828, 833 (1776) (emphasis added). McDougal &: Lans, 
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Doubtless the delegates from the several States believed themselves 
authorized to send Franklin in search of an alliance. The resulting 
treaty, it bears emphasis, was concluded with "the thirteen United 
States of North America, viz. New Hampshire, Massachusetts Bay," 
and so forth,180 scarcely testimony that France thought it was con-
cluding an alliance with a sovereign nation. But give the "revolu-
tionary" central government its widest scope, and it still remains 
to ask, what relevance do deeds resulting from revolutionary neces-
sity in the absence of an existing national structure have to a sub-
sequent written document, such as the Articles of Confederation, 
which carefully enumerates the powers granted and reserves all 
powers not "expressly delegated"?181 John Jay later wrote of the 
treaty-making power in The Federalist No. 64 that "it should not be 
delegated but ... with such precautions as will afford the highest 
security ... .''182 
Study of the constitutional records convinces that the Founders 
jealously insisted on a federal government of enumerated, strictly 
limited powers.188 In creating first Governors, and then the Presi-
dent, they purposely cut all roots to the royal prerogative.184' Not 
for them the aureole with which Justice Sutherland endowed the 
supra note 5, at 537, therefore say truly that "these early Congresses • • • although 
controlling foreign policy, essentially functioned as councils of ambassadorial dele· 
gates from a group of federated states • • • ," a statement that undercuts Sutherland's 
dictum that the States never had external "sovereignty." 
180. 11 JoUR. CoNTL. CoNG. 421 (1778). Sutherland, 299 U.S. at 317, also relied on 
Rufus King's remarks in the Convention: "The States were not 'sovereigns' in the 
sense contended for by some. They did not possess the peculiar features of sovereignty. 
They could not make war, nor peace, nor alliances, nor treaties." 1 M. FARRAND, supra 
note 30, at 323. But these remarks are at war with the facts. 
Levitan, The Foreign Relations Power: An Analysis of Mr. Justice Sutherland's 
Theory, 55 YALE L.J. 467 (1946), furnishes additional confirmation for rejection of 
Sutherland's views. Levitan demonstrates that the Continental "Congress was a com-
mittee of safety having as its basic aim the defeat of Great Britain. At no time was 
it viewed, nor did it view itself as a governmental organization having legislative 
authority." Id. at 483. The "record of events leaves no doubts that treaty-making 
power was exercised by the States." Id. at 485. The States did not deem the 1778 
Franklin treaty "binding on them, until they had individually ratified the treaty." 
Id. at 486. The 1776-1787 history, he concludes, "leaves little room for the acceptance 
of Mr. Justice Sutherland's 'inherent' powers, or in fact 'extra-constitutional' powers 
theory." Id. at 496. 
That so solid a demonstration of the vulnerability of the Sutherland dicta should 
not have discouraged further citation is not the least remarkable chapter in the 
history of Curtiss-Wright. 
181. Articles of Confederation, art. II, quoted in H. CoMMAGER, supra note 160, at 
lll. 
182. THE FEDERALIST No. 64, supra note 21, at 417. 
183. See note 96; text accompanying notes 94-128 supra. For additional citations, 
see BERGER, CONGRESS, supra note 32, at 13-14, 377 n.52; Berger, Privilege, supra note 
73, at 1075. See also text accompanying note 23 supra. 
184. See notes 96-97 supra and accompanying text. 
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President's power over foreign relations. That power was no less 
circumscribed than the domestic powers as Madison made clear.1sis 
A supraconstitutional "residuum" of powers not granted expressly 
or by necessary implication was not only furthest from their 
thoughts,186 but avowal of such a "residuum" would have affrighted 
them and barred adoption of the Constitution.187 To conjure up an 
"inherent" executive power in the teeth of this history is both to 
shut our eyes to the historical record and to abort the plainly mani-
fested intention of the Founders to create a federal government of 
limited and enumerated powers. 
I!. EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS 
A. Evolution 
Executive agreements are not mentioned in the Constitution, in 
the Constitutional Convention, or in the Ratification Conventions; 
indeed the term is of comparatively recent vintage.188 Starting from 
a trickle,189 executive agreements made by the President alone-
which can involve large financial, and possibly military commit~ 
ments190-have, since 1930, mounted to a flood. Many of these 
185. See text accompanying note 152 supra. 
186. In his 1791 Lectures, James Wilson, then a Justice of the Supreme Court, 
referred to the executive powers granted by the Constitution and to the presidential 
veto as "a guard to protect his powers against [the Legislature's] encroachment. Such 
powers and such a guard he ought to possess: but a just distribution of the powers 
of government requires that he should possess no more." I J. WILSON, supra note 95, 
at 319 (emphasis added). 
187. As Alexander White of Virginia stated in the First Congress, after insisting 
that the federal government must adhere to the limits described in the Constitution: 
"This was the ground on which the friends of the Government supported the Con-
stitution • • • • [I]t could not have been supported on any other. If this principle 
had not been successfully maintained by its advocates in the convention of the state 
from which I come, the Constitution would never have been ratified." 1 ANNAU; OF 
CONG. 515 (1789). Cf. BERGER, CONGRESS, supra note 32, at 13-16. 
188. "Actually there are few documents which bear the title 'executive agreement.' 
••• But this phrase is used by the Department of State as the title of the series of 
publications listing important international agreements, negotiated subsequent to 
1930, which did not receive Senatorial consent under Article II, Section 2, prior 
to ratification." McDougal &: Lans, supra note 5, at 198 n.16. 
189. The power was appraised modestly enough in 1917 in CORWIN, CONTROL, supra 
note 28, at 125, when he referred to "the President's prerogative in the making of 
international compacts of a temporary nature and not demanding enforcement by 
the courts," and prophetically stated that it "is likely to become larger before it 
begins to shrink." 
"Since 1933 there has been a considerable extension in the use of the executive 
agreement, and it has been employed for purposes never contemplated by statesmen 
or l\Titers before 1930. This movement was accelerated since the Curtiss-Wright 
decision in 1937, avowing a wide inherent power of the Federal government to deal 
with foreign affairs." Borchard, Treaties and Executive Agreements-A. Reply, 54 YALE 
L.J. 616, 649 (1945). 
190. Consider, for example the 435 million dollars in credits and assistance promised 
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agreements the State Department refuses to reveal even to the 
Senate,191 the constitutional participant in the making of inter-
national agreements. Even apologists for executive agreements agree 
that secret agreements are undesirable and that they should be subject 
to debate and the "salutary influence of public opinion."192 
to Portugal in return for a twenty-five month extension of base rights in the Azores. N.Y. 
Times, April 3, 1972, at 7, col. I. An editorial in the Times remarks, "the stationing 
of American troops abroad and the establishment of military bases ••• can commit 
the nation to war in some instances as thoroughly as a treaty of alliance." N.Y. Times, 
May I, 1972, at 32, col. I. For secret promises by Admiral Carney to Greece of atomic 
support, and a secret agreement governing nonwithdrawal of combat troops stationed 
in Europe, see C. SULZBERGER, A LONG Row OF CANDLES 867, 923 (1969). 
191. Indeed, a civil servant, apparently an officer or former officer of the State 
Department, suggested that "for controversial acts the Senate method may well be 
quietly abandoned, and the instruments handled as executive agreements." 1N. 
McCLURE, INTERNATIONAL :ExECUTIVE AGREEMENTS 378 (1941). 
Professor Philip B. Kurland, Chief Consultant to the Senate Subcommittee on 
Separation of Powers, stated before that Committee in an exchange with former 
Secretary of State Dean Acheson that "[t]his committee ••• attempted to secure from 
the State Department a list, not even the contents, but a list of executive agreements 
between this country and foreign countries and the State Department has been unwill-
ing to afford that information to this committee. There are some hundred odd such 
agreements, the contents of which I think are unknown." Hearings, supra note 13, at 
268. See also statement of Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr., Washington Post, April 25, 1972, 
at A-7, col. I. An editorial in the New York Times, May 1, 1972, at 32, col. 1, states: 
The tendency of Presidents to circumvent the Constitutional requirement for 
Senate approval of treaties by concluding executive agreements has reached 
extraordinary proportions in recent years. In the 150 years prior to 1939, the 
United States entered into 799 treaties and 1,182 executive agreements, one-and-
one-half times as many. In the last 26 years, according to State Department com-
pilations, 368 treaties have been concluded but fifteen times that many executive 
agreements have been signed-a total of 5,590. In addition, there are over 400 
secret agreements, the nature of which the State Department declines to reveal. 
Moreover, thousands of other executive agreements evidently have been con-
cluded by other governmental agencies, particularly the Defense Department, 
which reportedly refuses to disclose the details even to Congressional Committees. 
Former Secretary of Defense, Clark Clifford, testified before the Senate that executive 
agreements lead "to excessive secrecy in policy-making, and [they] can lead to implied 
national commitments to other nations •.•. " Washington Post, April 25, 1972, at A-7, 
col. 3. 
192. In the course of vigorous advocacy of executive agreements, McDougal and Lans 
stated: "No one believes that secret agreements-except to the extent necessitated by 
war-time exigencies-are desirable, ••• debate in the House of Representatives can 
only be an additional safegnard and provide public education of the highest value." 
McDougal &: Lans, supra note 5, at 552-53. "In any situation," they said, "reference of 
an important international agreement to Congress has the undoubted advantage of 
stimulating public discussion of the issues involved and permits the Executive's judg-
ment to be questioned and checked by independent critics •••• " Id. at 555-56. Former 
Secretary of State Dean Acheson testified that "in most cases a legislative agreement 
would be better. You bring the House in and you have a much broader basis of 
support." He related that when he proposed that the UNNRA relief agreement should 
be an executive agreement, Senator Arthur Vandenberg exploded and "the State 
Department was scared off." Hearings, supra note 13, at 268. As "a rule, international 
agreements, as well as treaties, should be entered i,;ito only in such a way that the 
salutary influence of public opinion can be brought to bear on them; the country 
should not, as a rule, be bound by stipulations of executive agreements without its 
knowledge and without opportunity to protest." J. MATHEWS, AMERICAN FOREIGN 
RELATIONS: CONDUcr AND POLICIES 545-46 (1938). 
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Roused by this state of affairs, the Senate has recently moved to 
limit presidential circumvention of legislative prerogative by re-
quiring that executive agreements be submitted for information, 
and is also considering legislation that would confirm Senate power 
to veto executive agreements.193 Since executive agreements are said 
to spring from the President's independent powers,194 it is necessary 
to investigate the premise on which such a theory rests and whether 
the bills presently before Congress invade an area exclusively en-
trusted to the President.195 
Article II, section 2, of the Constitution provides that the Presi-
dent "shall have power, by and with the Advice and Consent of 
the Senate, to make Treaties ..•. " At the adoption of the Constitu-
tion, the word "treaties" had a broad connotation; in the words of 
Nicholas Bailey's (1729) dictionary, a treaty was "an agreement 
between two or more distinct Nations concerning Peace, Commerce, 
Navigation, etc." Hamilton construed "treaty" in the broadest terms: 
[F]rom the best opportunity of knowing the fact, 1 aver, that it was 
understood by all to be the intent of the provision to give that 
power the most ample latitude-to render it competent to all the 
stipulations which the exigencies of national affairs might require; 
competent to the making of treaties of alliance, treaties of commerce, 
treaties of peace, and every other species of convention usual among 
nations .... And it was emphatically for this reason that it was so 
carefully guarded; the cooperation of two-thirds of the Senate, with 
the President, being required to make any treaty whatever.196 
Those indefatigable advocates of executive agreements, 
McDougal and Lans,197 state that "there are no significant criteria, 
193. See text accompanying notes 9-11 supra. 
194. McDougal & Lans, supra note 5, at 199. Cf. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 
229 (1942). 
195. The discussion will be confined to the legality of an executive agreement as 
a matter of internal Jaw, i.e., its constitutional status. Its legal effect as a matter of 
international law, e.g., whether a foreign nation is entitled to rely on an "unauthorized" 
executive agreement, is a separate question which is not here considered. 
196. Letters of Camillus, in 6 A. HAMILTON, supra note 91, at 183 (emphasis 
original). Compare Story's restatement: "The power 'to make treaties' ••• embraces 
all sorts of treaties, for peace or war; for commerce or territory; for alliance or succors; 
for indemnity for injuries or payment of debts; for the recognition and enforcement 
of principles of public law; and for any other purposes, which the policy or interests 
of independent sovereigns may dictate in their intercourse with each other." 2 J. STORY, 
supra note 118, § 1508, at 338-39. The Hamilton-Story view is reflected in Geofroy v. Riggs, 
133 U.S. 258, 266-67 (1890): "That the treaty power ••• extends to all proper subjects 
of negotiation between our government and the government of other nations, is 
clear •••• It is not perceived that there is any limit to the questions which can be 
adjusted" subject to constitutional limitations. 
197. Their article, supra note 5, runs to some 250 pages, the bulk of which is 
devoted to a plea for agreements fashioned by the President with the approval of a 
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under the Constitution . . . or in the diplomatic practice of this 
government, by which the genus 'treaty' can be distinguished from 
the genus 'executive agreement' other than the single criterion of the 
procedure or authority by which the United States' consent to 
ratification [by the Senate] is obtained.''198 It follows that the express 
provision for treaty-making by the Senate and President jointly-
which embraces "all the stipulations which ... national affairs might 
require . . . and every other species of convention" --covers the 
field,199 and therefore, as Justice Jackson stated in the Youngstown 
case, the presidential claim to power is "clearly eliminated.''200 On 
the historical facts, the question, in the words of Professor Philip 
Kurland, is, "Should the Constitution really be read to mean that 
majority of both Senate and House, as distinguished from consent by two thirds of 
the Senate alone. But they break more than one lance for the solo presidential agree-
ment. Id. at 205, 223, 247-51, 311, 317, 338. With respect to the suggestion that the 
President has a plenary power to "make international agreements on any subject 
whatever," they state that "[i]t is not necessary ••• to come to a conclusion on this 
point. What is completely certain is that the powers of the Congress can be superaddcd 
to those of the President, and that the uvo sets of powers taken together are plenary." 
Id. at 246. Their comment on the argument that executive agreements conduce to the 
"dangers of 'secret diplomacy' " points up their ambivalence: 
These arguments appear to be rooted in a simple failure to differentiate between 
the two principal classes of executive agreements: those perfected by the President 
on his own responsibility, and those made in pursuance of Congressional authori-
zation. The Constitution of the United States is, fortunately, sufficiently flexible 
that it presents no necessity for choosing between the Scylla of a foreign policy 
dominated by a Senatorial minority and the Charybdis of simple Presidential 
agreements. It offers a third and thoroughly democratic alternative: the Con-
gressional-Executive agreement, eliminating both the possibility of arbitrary, 
injudicious or secret action and the disintegrating effects of minority obstruc-
tionism. 
Id. at 552. 
198. Id. at 199 (emphasis original). They also say, "Nor does the Constitution state 
any limitation upon the scope of the subject matter of treaties.'' Id. at 220. But Mc-
Dougal and Lans conclude that "all distinctions in the naming of these agreements-
'treaties,' 'executive agreements,' or 'Congressional-Executive agreements'-are merely 
convenient labels .•.• " Id. at 226. 
Corwin also considers that "the criteria seem lacking for a nice differentiation of 
the prerogative under discussion [executive agreements] from the treaty making power, 
with the result that its curtailment ••• is a problem of practical statesmanship rather 
than of Constitutional Law." CoRWIN, CONTROL, supra note 28, at 120-21. Given the 
express provision for Senate participation in treaty-making, any exclusion by solo 
presidential agreements from such participation plainly presents a problem of "consti-
tutional law." 
199. Cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 639 (1952) (Jackson, J., 
concurring). Given that "treaties" cover the field, it is unimportant that the "Constitu-
tion does not provide that the treaty-making procedure is to be the exclusive mode.'' 
McDougal & Lans, supra note 5, at 216. Ordinarily, express mention of one mode is 
thought to exclude another, subject to rebuttal, for example, by a contrary legislative 
purpose. Here the legislative intention confirms the implication of exclusivity. The 
treaty power was granted to Senate and President jointly, as Hamilton explained, in 
order to "afford a greater prospect of security, than the separate possession of it by 
either of them." THE FEDERALIST No. 75, supra note 21, at 488. See text accompanying 
notes 205-13 infra. 
200. 343 U.S. 579, 639 (1952). 
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by calling an agreement an executive agreement rather than a treaty, 
the obligation to secure Senate approval is dissolved?"201 
Fired by zeal in the midst of World War II to prevent another 
holocaust by the building of a world union, and to forestall obstruc-
tion to this union by a "wilful," "undemocratic" Senate minority202 
-such as blocked our adherence to the League of Nations-
McDougal and Lans consigned to deepest limbo the "assumption 
that the treaty-making procedure is exclusive." They stamped as 
vain all "efforts to woo [the] enigmatic meaning" of the treaty 
clause; the "true intention" of the Framers they considered "a 
speculative domain of impenetrable obscurity."203 However impene-
trable the intention of the Framers may be in other respects, they 
made clear beyond doubt that the specific objective of the treaty 
clause was to preclude the President, acting alone, from entering 
into international agreements. This point is so vital as to bear 
detailed exposition. 
Hamilton, who has been said to reflect the consensus of the 
Framers,204 stated in The Federalist No. 75, that treaties are 
agreements between sovereign and sovereign ... the vast importance 
of the trust, and the operation of treaties as laws, plead strongly for 
the participation of the whole or a portion of the legislative body in 
the office of making them . . . it would be utterly unsafe and im-
proper to entrust [the entire power of making treaties] to an elective 
magistrate . . . . The history of human conduct does not warrant 
that exalted opinion of human virtue which would make it wise in 
a nation to commit interests of so delicate and momentous a kind, as 
those which concern its intercourse with the rest of the world, to the 
sole disposal of a magistrate created and circumstanced as would be 
a President of the United States .... It must indeed be clear to a 
demonstration that the joint possession of the power in question, by 
the President and the Senate, would afford a greater prospect of se-
curity, than the separate possession of it by either of them.205 
201. Kurland, supra note 145, at 626. 
202. See McDougal &: Laos, supra note 5, at 187, 535, 563, 565, 567, 569, 575, 602. 
203. Id. at 216-17. 
204. "It cannot be reasonably doubted that Hamilton was here, as at other points, 
endeavoring to reproduce the matured conclusions of the Convention itself." E. CORWIN, 
THE DOC'I'RINE OF JUDICIAL REv!EW 44 (1914). 
205. THE FEDERALISI' No. 75, supra note 21, at 486-87, 488. Apparently the point 
loomed so large in the public mind that it had earlier been made by John Jay in 
No. 64, and by Hamilton in No. 69. Jay said: "The power of making treaties is an 
important one, especially as it relates to war, peace and commerce; it should not 
be delegated but in such a mode, and with such precautions, as will afford the 
highest security that it will be exercised by men the best qualified for the purpose, 
and in the manner most conducive to the public good," i.e., as provided by the 
treaty clause. Id. at 417. In No. 69, Hamilton stated: "The king of Great Britain is 
the sole and absolute representative of the nation in all foreign transactions. He can 
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A number of Framers spoke to the same effect in the Ratification 
Conventions. James Wilson said in Pennsylvania, "[I]f the powers 
of either branch are perverted, it must be with the approbation of 
some one of the other branches of government. Thus checked on 
each side, they can do no one act of themselves."206 In South Caro-
lina, C. C. Pinckney said, "Surely there is greater security in vesting 
this power as the present Constitution has vested it, than in any 
other body. Would the gentleman vest it in the President alone? 
I£ he would, his assertion that the power we have granted was as 
dangerous as the power vested by Parliament in the proclamations 
of Henry VIII, might have been, perhaps, warranted • . . . [The 
Senate] joined with the President ... form together a body in whom 
can be best and most safely vested the diplomatic power of the 
Union."207 In North Carolina, William Davie stated that "jealousy 
of executive power" would not permit a grant of treaty power to 
the President alone.208 Shortly thereafter, Roger Sherman, a delegate 
to the Constitutional Convention, stated in the First Congress, 
[t]he establishment of every treaty requires the voice of the Senate, 
as does the appointment of every officer for conducting the business. 
These two objects are expressly provided for in the Constitution, and 
they lead me to believe that the two bodies ought to act jointly in 
every transaction which respects the business of negotiation with 
foreign powers .... There is something more required than respon-
sibility in conducting treaties. The Constitution contemplates the 
united wisdom of the President and Senate, in order to make treaties 
.... The more wisdom there is employed, the greater security there 
is that the public business will be well done.209 
Across the vista of forty-five years, Joseph Story restated these 
views.210 
of his own accord make treaties of peace, commerce, alliance, and of every other 
description .••• In this respect, therefore, there is no comparison between the intended 
power of the President, and the actual power of the British sovereign. The one 
can perform alone what the other can do only with the concurrence of a branch of 
the legislature." Id. at 450-51 (emphasis added). 
206. 2 J. ELLIOT, supra note 30, at 466. And he stated: "Neither the President nor 
the Senate, solely, can complete a treaty; they are checks upon each other, and are 
so balanced as to produce security to the people." Id. at 507. 
207. 4 id. at 280-81. 
208. Id. at 120. 
209. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 1085 (1789) (emphasis added). See also text accompanying 
notes 48-63 supra. 
210. 2 J. STORY, supra note 118, § 1512, at 341, 343-44: 
Considering the delicacy and extent of the power, it is too much to expect that 
a free people would confide to a single magistrate, however respectable, the sole 
authority to act conclusively, as well as exclusively, upon the subject of treaties 
...• But however proper it may be in a monarchy, there is no American statesman 
but must feel that such a prerogative in an American president would be inex-
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Thus, the Founders made unmistakably plain their intention 
to withhold from the President the power to enter into treaties all 
by himself, because, as Francis Corbin said in Virginia, "It would 
be dangerous to give this power to the President alone."211 Hence, 
they circumscribed his power over foreign intercourse by requiring 
Senate participation in "every ... species of convention usual among 
nations."212 To circumvent that careful design by a mere change 
of labels, by substituting the words "executive agreements" for 
"treaties"-bearing in mind the absence of "significant criteria" for 
distinguishing between the two--is to reduce the restrictions so 
carefully fashioned by the Framers to ropes of sand.213 
McDougal and Lans maintain, however, that the 
Framers themselves explicitly recognized that there are international 
agreements other than treaties and put this recognition into the docu-
ment. In Article I, Section 10 the Constitution ... provides that 
"No state shall enter into any treaty, alliance or confederation," but 
continues that "No state shall, without the consent of Congress ... 
enter into any agreement or compact with another state, or with a 
foreign power." Unless one takes the position that the Framers sought 
to deny to the Federal Government the power to use techniques of 
agreement made available to the states-an argument completely 
refuted by the debates at the Convention and by contemporaneous 
history-the conclusion is inescapable that the Federal Government 
was intended to have the power to make "agreements" or "com-
pacts."214 
To the contrary, the fact that the Framers explicitly authorized 
pedient and dangerous. It would be inconsistent with that wholesome jealousy 
which all republics ought to cherish, of all depositaries of power • • •• 
See also id. § 1515. 
211. 3 J. ELLIOT, supra note 30, at 509. 
212. Letters of Camillus, in 6 A. HAMILTON, supra note 91, at 183. See text ac-
companying note 196 supra. 
213. Compare McDougal &: Lans, supra note 5, at 199, quoted in text at note 198. 
A lay view was aptly expressed in an editorial of the New York Times, April 17, 1944, 
at 22, col. 1: to suggest that "treaties" be called "agreements," said the Times, "is 
merely to argue that we can get around the Constitution by conspiring with each 
other to call a spade by another name." See also K. COLEGROVE, THE AMERICAN SENATE 
AND WORLD PEACE 31, 110 (1944); 2 C. HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 1417 (2d ed. 1945). 
"The people," said 1 J. STORY, supra note 118, § 451, at 345, make and adopt constitu-
tions, and "must be supposed to read them, with the help of common sense, and cannot 
be presumed to admit in them any recondite meaning •.•• " Justice Richard Yates, a 
delegate to the Convention from New York, took for granted in 1788 that judges would 
be bound to "give such meaning to the constitution, as comports best with the 
common, and generally received acceptation of the words in which it is expressed, 
regarding their ordinary and popular use •••. " Quoted in E. CORWIN, CoURT OVER 
CoNmnmON 235 (1938). So broad was the popular understanding of the scope of 
"treaty," as evidenced by Hamilton, that it left no room for other international 
agreements. 
214. McDougal &: Lans, supra note 5, at 221. 
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the States to enter into "agreements" but omitted to do so in the 
case of the President implies a deliberate decision to withhold that 
power from him.215 It is a non sequitur, moreover, to deduce from a 
grant of power to a State to make "agreements" with the consent 
of Congress, a presidential power to make such agreements alto-
gether free of congressional consent; let alone that such a construc-
tion collides with the Founders' unmistakable intention to limit 
presidential action in the diplomatic area by the requirement of 
Senate consent. The rule of construction is to carry out, not to 
defeat, that intention.216 
So too, the McDougal-Lans appeal to history is misconceived. 
Of course, there was general recognition of the vices of a weak, 
ineffectual federal government; but to many this did not seem nearly 
so perilous as a potentially tyrannical central government.217 It is 
also true that a woeful deficiency under the Articles of Confed-
eration had been State noncompliance with treaties, and the Con-
stitution therefore made treaties enforceable against the States.218 
But as Willoughby points out, "[i]n the State ratifying conventions 
the fact that treaties were to be superior to State constitutions and 
laws created not a little fear of possible oppression."219 Well aware 
of such sentiments, the Framers had taken pains to circumscribe the 
power.220 
At every turn there was jealous suspicion of a centralized govern-
ment and insistence upon a grudging, carefully limited grant of 
enumerated powers.221 The Framers went so far as expressly to 
empower the President to ask for written opinions from executive 
215. Compare T.I.M.E., Inc. v. United States, 359 U.S. 464, 471 (1959): "Vve find it 
impossible to impute to Congress an intention to give such a right to shippers under 
the Motor Carrier Act when the very sections which established tbat right in Part I 
[for railroads] were wholly omitted in the Motor Carrier Act," Then too, tbe State 
"agreement" clause was contrived to meet a special situation. See text accompanying 
notes 230-31 infra. 
216. We cannot rightly prefer "a meaning which will defeat rather than effectuate 
the constitutional purpose." United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 316 (1941). In 
the First Congress, Elbridge Gerry stated, "Why should we construe any part of the 
Constitution in such a manner as to destroy its essential principles, when a more 
consonant construction can be obtained?" I .ANNAIS OF CONG. 473 (1789). 
217. See BERGER, CONGRESS, supra note 32, at 8-14, 260-61. 
218. Id. at 135, 234-35, 239, 307, 309, 372-73, 380, 381 n.73. 
219. I W. WILLOUGHBY, THE CoNsrrrunoNAL LAw OF nm UNITED STATES 520 (2d ed. 
1929). 
220. See text accompanying notes 94-122 supra. 
221. For example, E. Pierce, speaking generally, stated in Massachusetts, "I believe 
such a superior power ought to be in Congress. But I would have it distinctly bounded, 
that everyone may know the utmost limits of it •••• " 2 J. Eu.roT, supra note 30, at 77. 
See also Samuel Stillman, id. at 176; text accompanying notes 116-22 supra. 
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department heads;222 but under the reasoning of McDougal and 
Lans, the Framers had no qualms about entrusting to the President 
"inherent" powers of unlimited scopel223 Lee, however, assured the 
Virginia Ratification Convention that "[w]hen a question arises 
with respect to the legality of any power, exercised or assumed by 
Congress [the question will be] ... Is it enumerated in the Con-
stitution? ... It is otherwise arbitrary and unconstitutional."224 The 
President was not held in higher esteem, witness the frequent out-
cries against monarchical tendencies, and the power given Congress 
to impeach the President. Notwithstanding assurances such as that 
of Lee,2215 the people demanded the tenth amendment to make sure 
that powers not delegated to the federal government were reserved 
to the States. 
Another factor contributing to insistence on Senate participation 
in treaty-making was noted by William Davie, who explained that 
because of "the extreme jealousy of the little states" it "became 
necessary to give them absolute equality [in the Senate] in making 
treaties,"226 a statement confirmed by another Framer, Richard 
Spaight.227 To conceive that the "little states" would then leave the 
barn door wide open so that the President could singlehandedly 
enter into executive agreements without their concurrence is to 
upend history. McDougal and Lans explain that "[t]he need to 
propitiate the small states-a rationale whose contemporary in-
validity is indicated in a subsequent Section [ of their article, which 
dwells on the diminishing importance of States' Rights ]-surely 
might have been adequate reason for failure to state more explicitly 
the scope of powers conferred" on the House,228 and, by parity of 
reasoning, on the President. More baldly stated, this is an appeal to 
repudiate the representations and compromise made to secure the 
adherence of the small States to the Constitution, a sorry basis for 
the authors' high-minded plea for a more "democratic" process. In 
seeking the meaning of constitutional language, it is the under-
standing of the Framers that is all important. As Justice Iredell, 
who had fought valiantly but vainly for ratification in North 
Carolina, said, "We are too apt, in estimating a law passed at a 
222. U.S. CoNsr. art. II, § 2, cl. I. 
223. The point was made by Justice Jackson in Youngstown Sheet &: Tube Co. 
v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 640-41 (1952) (concurring opinion). 
224. 3 J. ELLIOT, supra note 30, at 186. 
225. BERGER, CONGRESS, supra note 32, at 13-14, 124-35. 
226. 4 J. ELLIOT, supra note 30, at 120. See McDougal&: I.ans, supra note 5, at 538. 
227. 4 J. ELLIOT, supra note 30, at 27. 
228. McDougal &: Lans, supra note 5, at 236. 
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remote period, to combine, in our consideration, all the subsequent 
events which have had an influence upon it, instead of confining 
ourselves (which we ought to do) to the existing circumstances at 
the time of its passing."229 
Before leaving the State "compact" clause, a word as to the 
distinction there drawn between a "treaty, alliance or confederation" 
and an "agreement or compact." How does this square with the 
comprehensive scope given to the treaty clause by Hamilton? "Agree-
ments" and "compacts" between some States, regulating boundaries, 
rights of fishery, and the like-of which the Framers were doubtless 
aware-had been entered into prior to adoption of the Constitu-
tion. 280 It is reasonable to infer that the "compact" clause provided 
for such arrangements, drawing a distinction between them and 
the more political "treaty, alliance or confederation," which were 
forbidden absolutely. Given the broad understanding of federal 
treaties recorded by Hamilton, there is no place in the treaty clause 
for the more restricted reading of "treaty" as it is used in the 
"compact" clause, where a distinction was made to meet a special 
situation. It is familiar learning that the same words may have 
different meanings in the different contexts of the.same statute when 
they are directed to different purposes.281 In any event, the decisive 
factor is not the content of "agreement" so much as the fact that 
the sole use of that word in the Constitution was conditioned on 
consent by Congress. It cannot be divorced from such consent in 
order to liberate the President from the consent of the Senate that 
the treaty clause requires. 
It remains to consider a remarkable assertion by McDougal and 
Lans: where executive "agreements are predicated upon the Presi-
dent's independent constitutional powers, such as in the field of 
foreign relations, under the separation of powers doctrine, Congress-
ional action might not affect . . . the domestic effect of the agree-
ment ... .''282 They are aware that "a treaty may be terminated ... 
by a Congressional act ... " ;288 but 
229. Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 267 (1796). 
230. Weinfield, What Did the Framers of the Federal Constitution Mean by "Agree-
ments or Compacts?", 3 U. Cm. L. R.Ev. 453, 464 (1936). Writing in 1803, Judge St. 
George Tucker cited the Virginia-Maryland "compact" of 1785 for the regulation of 
navigation on boundary waters and the like, as an example of the "agreements or 
compacts" contemplated by the compact clause. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, app., 
at 309 (Tucker ed. 1803). 
231. Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 433-34 (1932). 
232. McDougal & Lans, supra note 5, at 338. 
233. Id. at 334. 
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if the subject of the [executive] agreement is a matter within the 
President's special constitutional competence-related, for example, 
to the recognition of a foreign government or to an exercise of his 
authority as Commander-in-Chief . . . the separation of powers 
doctrine might . . . permit the President to disregard the statute 
as an unconstitutional invasion of his own power.234 
Thus an executive agreement, nowhere mentioned in the Constitu-
tion, is exalted above a treaty for which explicit provision is made-a 
treaty may be repealed by Congress, not so an executive agreement! 
The Commander-in-Chief power is ill-suited to support such a 
claim. Hamilton explained that this authority "would amount to 
nothing more than the supreme command and direction of the mili-
tary and naval forces, as first General and admiral ... ";235 and Cor-
win properly understood this to mean that the President "will have 
no powers that any high military or naval commander ... might not 
have,"236 an unlikely source of power to enter into untouchable 
international agreements. Then, too, virtually every State Con-
stitution had made the Governor "Commander in Chief," who was 
to act under the laws of the State, which is to say, subject to legis-
lative governance.237 Reiterated emphasis in the several Ratifying 
Conventions that the President's major function was to execute 
the laws,238 reinforced by the Article II, section 3 provision that 
"he shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed," reflects 
the same concern and repels any inference that the Commander-in-
Chief clause conferred power which soars above the "law-making" 
powers of Congress. Similarly, the President's power of "recognition" 
derives from his power to "receive" ambassadors, which Hamilton 
was constrained to explain "is more a matter of dignity than of 
234. Id. at 317. 
235. THE FEDERALIST No. 69, supra note 21, at 448. 
236. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT, supra note 6, at 276. For extended discussion, see 
Berger, War-Making, supra note 17, at 37-38. Compare the Supreme Court statement 
in Tucker v. Alexandroff, 183 U.S. 424, 435 (1902) that the "commander-in-chief" would 
require statutory authorization for the return under treaty of Russian deserters. See text 
accompanying note 243 infra. 
237. Article VII of the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 provides that the 
Governor shall be "commander-in-chief," and that his powers shall "be exercised agree-
ably to ••• the laws of the land and not otherwise." I B. PooRE, supra note 96, at 
965-66. For Delaware, Article 9, id. at 275; for Georgia, Article 33, id. at 381; for 
New Hampshire (identical with Massachusetts), 2 id. at 1288. 
Hamilton stated in THE FEDERALIST No. 69, supra note 21, at 449: "The constitutions 
of several of the States expressly declare their governors to be commanders-in-chief 
••• and it may well be a question, whether those of New Hampshire and Massachusetts, 
in particular, do not, in this instance, confer larger powers upon their respective 
governors, than could be claimed by a President of the United States." 
238. See text accompanying notes 97-109 supra. 
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authority" and "will be without consequence in the administration 
of the government ... . "289 On such flimsy foundations McDougal and 
Lans would erect an "independent" presidential power to enter into 
executive agreements, which are beyond "invasion" by Congress. 
The crowning incongruity is their appeal to the separation of 
powers to protect such solo agreements from congressional invasion. 
What magic in the dubious, inexplicit presidential solo power calls 
forth a protection denied to the express provision for Senate par-
ticipation in the all-inclusive treaty-making power? Why does respect 
for express constitutional provisions exhibit "mechanical, filio-
pietistic" slavery to words240 whereas invocation of implicit doc-
trines such as the separation of powers is free of that taint? To my 
mind, McDougal and Lans apply a double standard of constitutional 
interpretation, turning on whose ox is gored. 
B. Supreme Court Decisions 
Constitutional "law" seldom exhibits such frail underpinning as 
was mustered by McDougal and Lans for judicial recognition of solo 
presidential executive agreements. Consider their reliance on Tucker 
v. Alexandroff,241 in which "the Supreme Court intimated by way 
of dictum that the President was empowered to make agreements 
permitting passage of foreign troops through the United States and 
could thereby divest all American officials of jurisdiction over such a 
military force."242 The issue presented was whether a member of the 
Russian navy, who had deserted while awaiting the launching of a 
Russian war ship in Philadelphia, came within a Russian treaty 
calling for return of deserters from Russian ships. In passing, the 
Court remarked: 
While no act of Congress authorizes the executive department to 
permit the introduction of foreign troops, the power to give such 
permission without legislative assent was probably assumed to exist 
from the authority of the President as commander-in-chief .... It may 
be doubted, however, whether such power could be extended to 
the apprehension of deserters in the absence of positive legislation to 
that effect.243 
As Corwin said, the question of the validity of "this species of agree-
ment" was "touched upon in rather equivocal terms."244 If this be 
239. See text accompanying note 21 supra. 
240. See text accompanying note 271 infra. 
241. 183 U.S. 424 (1902). 
242. McDougal &: Lans, supra note 5, at 310. 
243. 183 U.S. at 435, 
244. CORWIN, CONTROL, supra note 28, at 118. 
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judicial recognition of executive agreements, the Court's emphasis 
that return of deserters required legislative assent confines it to the 
narrowest compass. 
Next, McDougal and Lans state: 
The general powers of the President to make executive agreements 
seem to have been first touched by the Supreme Court in 1933, 
in Monaco v. Mississippi wherein Chief Justice Hughes stated: "The 
National Government, by virtue of its control of our foreign rela-
tions is entitled to employ the resources of diplomatic negotiations 
and to effect such an international settlement as may be found appro-
priate, through treaty, agreement of arbitration, or otherwise."245 
The question in Monaco was whether a state could be sued by a 
foreign state without her consent; whether the President could make 
an executive agreement by himself was not in issue. Hughes' refer-
ence to the power of the "National Government" to act does not 
necessarily imply that the President is authorized to act without the 
consent of the Senate. A redistribution of constitutional powers 
should not rest on strained inferences.246 
McDougal and Lans next summon the Curtiss-Wright case.247 
That case, it will be recalled, was later dismissed by Justice Jackson 
because it "involved, not the question of the President's power to act 
without congressional authority, but the question of his right to act 
in accord with an act of Congress."248 Justice Sutherland's dictum 
regarding the President's "inherent" powers is without historical 
foundation; and his reliance on Marshall for the statement that 
"participation in the exercise of the power [over external affairs] is 
significantly limited"249 all but perverts Marshall's "sole organ" 
remark.250 Subsequent reliance on Sutherland's dicta underscores 
the wisdom of Marshall's dismissal of his own dicta in Marbury v. 
lvfadison251 when they were pressed upon him in a subsequent case.252 
245. McDougal & Lans, supra note 5, at 310, quoting 292 U.S. 313, 331 (1934) 
(emphasis by McDougal & Lans). 
246. As the Supreme Court stated in Brady v. Roosevelt S.S. Co., 317 U.S. 575, 
580-81 (1943), "[S)uch a basic change in one of the fundamentals of the law of agency 
should hardly be left to conjecture." 
247. McDougal & Lans, supra note 5, at 255-56, 310. 
248. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-36 & n.2 (1952) 
(concurring opinion). Curtiss-Wright merely held that the congressional delegation to 
the President was constitutional. 299 U.S. at 327-28. 
249. 299 U.S. at 319. For refutation of Sutherland's "inherent" power dictum, see 
text accompanying notes 94-122, 143-87 supra. 
250. See text accompanying notes 78-85 supra. 
251. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803). 
252. It is a maxim, not to be disregarded, that general expressions, in every 
opinion, are to be taken in connection with the case in which those expressions 
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"The dicta of the Monaco and Curtiss-Wright cases," McDougal 
and Lans tell us, "were the capstones of the decisions in the Belmont 
and Pink cases, dealing with the validity and interpretation of an 
assignment of Russian-mvned assets in the United States, which was 
one of several executive agreements negotiated when the United 
States recognized the Soviet government in 1933."253 In the Belmont 
case,254 Justice Sutherland once more delivered himself of sweeping 
dicta: 
[I]n respect of what was done here, the Executive had authority to 
speak as the sole organ of that [ national] government. The assign-
ment and the agreements in connection therewith did not, as in the 
case of treaties, as that term is used in the treaty making clause of 
the Constitution ... require the advice and consent of the Senate.255 
No account was taken by Sutherland of the history which dem-
onstrates the intention of the Founders to withhold from the 
President the right to enter into international agreements without 
Senate consent. Instead, he reasoned from B. Altman & Co. v. United 
States256 that an international compact may be distinguished from a 
treaty. There a reciprocal agreement had been made with France un-
der authority of the Tariff Act; and the sole question presented to the 
Court was whether Congress, by permitting a direct appeal to the 
Supreme Court with respect to treaties, intended to encompass such 
a compact. In answering this question, the Court stated, "True, 
that under the Constitution . . . the treaty-making power is vested 
in the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate," 
but it concluded that the reciprocal agreement "was a compact 
are used. If they go beyond the case, they may be respected, but ought not to 
control the judgment in a subsequent suit when the very point is presented for 
decision. The reason of this maxim is obvious. The question actually before the 
court is investigated with care, and considered in its full extent. Other principles 
which may serve to illustrate it, are considered in their relation to the case 
decided, but their possible bearing on all other cases is seldom completely investi• 
gated. 
Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 399-400 (1821). 
253. McDougal &: I.ans, supra note 5, at 311. 
254. United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937). 
255. 301 U.S. at 330. Sutherland disposed of the issues in lordly fashion: that the 
agreements "were within the competence of the President may not be doubted." Earlier 
he had stated that "international agreements which arc not treaties in the full 
constitutional sense, are perhaps confined to such as affect administrative matters, as 
distinguished from policies, and those which are of only individual concern, or of 
limited scope and duration, as distinguished from those of general consequence and 
permanent character." G. SUTHERLAND, supra note 22, at 121. 
Borchard stated that about 5 million dollars were accepted in return for the 
sacrifice of 300 million dollars in American claims arising out of confiscations in 
Russia. Borchard, supra note 189, at 647. 
256. 224 U.S. 583 (1912). 
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authorized by the Congress . .. and such a compact is a treaty" for 
the purposes of the appeals statute.257 In thus treating the authorized 
compact as a treaty for the purposes of a special appeals statute, the 
Court did not purport to sanction executive agreements not au-
thorized by Congress, a jump unhesitatingly made by Justice Suther-
land. Justice Stone, in an opinion joined by Justices Brandeis and 
Cardozo, concurred with a key reservation: 
We may, for present purposes, assume that the United States, by 
treaty ... could alter the policy which a State might otherwise adopt. 
It is unnecessary to consider whether the present agreement between 
the two governments can rightly be given the same effect as a treaty 
within this rule, for neither the allegations ... nor the diplomatic 
exchanges, suggest that the United States has either recognized or 
declared that any state policy is to be overridden.258 
And so we arrive at United States v. Pink,259 in which the issue 
reserved by Justice Stone was presented, and where Justice Douglas, 
citing Belmont and Curtiss-Wright, stated that the 
Litvinov Assignment was an international compact which did not 
require the participation of the Senate. . . . Power to remove such 
obstacles to full recognition as settlement of claims of our nationals 
... certainly is a modest implied power of the President who is the 
"sole organ of the federal government in the field of international 
relations."260 
The Pink case had no occasion to rule that a presidential agreement 
could be made against the wishes of Congress; and in fact Justice 
Douglas said that the executive policy had been "tacitly" recognized 
by congressional appointment of commissioners to determine Amer-
ican claims against the Soviet fund.261 The dissent of Chief Justice 
Stone, in which Justice Roberts joined, is incontrovertible: "[W]e 
are referred to no authority which would sustain such an exercise 
of power as is said to have been exerted here by mere assignment 
unratified by the Senate."262 
257. 224 U.S. at 600, 601 (emphasis added). 
258. 301 U.S. at 336 (emphasis added). 
259. 315 U.S. 203 (1942). 
260. 315 U.S. at 229. The Government had argued that "[t]he authority of the 
President to enter into executive agreements with foreign nations without the consent 
of the Senate is established," citing Monaco and Curtiss-Wright, 315 U.S. at 208 (em-
phasis added). Thus are dicta blown up into "established" law. 
261. 315 U.S. at 227-28. 
262. 315 U.S. at 249. McDougal &: Lans, supra note 5, at 310, also rely on Watts 
v. United States, I Wash. Terr. 288, 294 (1870), for the proposition that "an executive 
agreement between Great Britain and the United States ••. with regard to jurisdiction 
over San Juan Island, was deemed to modify the Organic Law of the territory, as 
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We need only recall Davie's references to the prevalent distrust 
of executive power,263 to the jealous insistence by the small States 
on participation in treaty-making on an equal basis in the Senate,26~ 
to the fears that surfaced in the Ratification Conventions-despite 
Senate participation-that the power to override state laws might 
lead to oppression,265 in order to conclude that without Senate par-
ticipation the treaty power would have found no acceptance. To 
allow an executive agreement to override state law or policy on the 
ground that it represents "a modest implied power" is to ignore the 
Founders' plain intention to withhold that power from the President. 
This is confirmed by Article VI, which makes only "Laws" and 
"Treaties" the "supreme law of the land," binding upon the states.266 
It would require a constitutional amendment, for which the Pink 
case is an inadequate substitute, to make an "executive agreement," 
concluded by the President alone, equally binding. 
At best, the not so "modest implied power" of the President to 
enter into such agreements with the tacit consent of Congress 
amounts to no more than a concurrent power that Congress can 
curtail by statute, as Justice Jackson reminded us in the Steel Seizure 
case.267 Were the issue presented anew by a congressional challenge 
to presidential entry into executive agreements without its consent, 
the cases would be far from conclusive. 
Ill. ADAPTATION BY USAGE 
There is no dispute about the intention of the Founders to make 
the Senate an equal partner in the conduct of foreign affairs. Nor 
is this a case in which "plain meaning is an illusory goal,"268 or in 
which an ambiguous grant to the President may be clarified by 
resort to his long-continued "practice." Were the textual require-
ment of Senate "advice and consent" in the making of treaties 
enacted by Congress." Whether one can distill such a "holding" from the three separate 
opinions in the case is at least debatable; and one may question whether the Supreme 
Court would allow a presidential agreement to override an Act of Congress. See text 
accompanying note 267 infra. 
263. See text accompanying note Ill supra. 
264. See text accompanying note 226 supra. 
265. See text accompanying note 219 supra. 
266. For discussion of the "binding" phrase, see BERGER, CONGRESS, supra note 32, at 
233-34. 
267. Youngstown Sheet &: Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637-39 (1952). Given 
concurrent powers, Chief Justice Marshall held in an early war-power case, a con-
gressional statute must prevail. Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 177-78 
(1804). 
268. Reveley, supra note 4, at 1251. 
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equivocal, its meaning was made clear beyond peradventure by the 
explanations of the Framers and Ratifiers.269 We begin, therefore, 
with an unambiguous constitutional requirement that treaties-
meaning all international agreements, and all that goes into their 
making-are to be the joint function of President and Senate. 
"Adaptation by usage" is a label designed to render palatable 
the disagreeable claim that the President may by his own practices 
revise the Constitution, that he may disrupt the constitutional dis-
tribution of powers, considered inviolable under the separation of 
powers.27° For McDougal and Lans, one who opposes this claim is 
enslaved by "the words of the Constitution as timeless absolutes," a 
prey "to mechanical, filio-pietistic theory": 271 "Whether these powers 
are based on an interpretation of the language of the Constitution 
or on usage is, strictly, a matter of concern only for rhetori-
cians .... "272 Impatiently brushing aside "the absolute artifacts of 
verbal archeology," "the idiosyncratic purposes of the Framers," 
they maintain that "continuance of [a] practice by successive ad-
ministrations throughout our history makes its contemporary con-
stitutionality unquestionable."278 In blunter terms, usurpation of 
269. Influential apologists for expanded presidential powers are agreed in this. See 
text accompanying note 29 supra. 
270. In rejecting the demand of the House for documents respecting the Jay Treaty, 
President Washington said, "It is essential to the due administration of the Govern-
ment, that the boundaries fixed by the Constitution between the different departments 
should be preserved." 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 761-62 (1796). The executive branch dings 
to the separation of powers when it claims a right to withhold information from Con-
gress under the doctrine of "executive privilege." See testimony of Secretary of State 
William P. Rogers and Assistant Attorney General William H. Rehnquist in July 1971. 
Hearings, supra note 13, at 473, 430. Compare Justice Douglas in Youngstown, 343 U.S. 
at 632 (concurring opinion): "If we sanctioned the present exercise of power by the 
President, we would be expanding Article II of the Constitution and rewriting it to 
suit the political conveniences of the present emergency." See also :Berger, War-Making, 
supra note 17, at 68-69 n.256. 
What the separation of powers meant to the Founders was spelled out in the 
Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, drafted by John Adams. Article XXX provides: 
"In the government of this commonwealth, the legislative department shall never 
exercise the executive and judicial powers, or either of them; the executive shall never 
exercise the legislative and judicial powers, or either of them; • • • to the end it 
may be a government of laws, not of men." 1 :B. POORE, supra note 96, at 960. See also 
the New Hampshire Constitution of 1784, pt. I, art. 37, 2 id. at 1283, and the Georgia 
Constitution of 1777, art. I, l id. at 378. 
Charles Pinckney submitted to the Convention that the President "cannot be 
cloathed with those executive authorities the Chief Magistrate of a Government often 
possesses; because they are vested in the Legislature, and cannot be used or delegated 
by them in any, but the specified mode." 3 M. FARRAND, supra note 30, at lll. 
271. McDougal &: Lans, supra note 5, at 212. 
272. Id. at 239 n.104 (emphasis original). 
273. Id. at 291. Compare their comment, "The phrase 'treaty of peace,' when bereft 
of the reification which makes it some mysterious, special kind of an agreement," 
is included in the scope of presidential executive agreements, id. at 286, with events 
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power, if repeated often enough, accomplishes an amendment of the 
Constitution and a transfer of power.274 
Although this view has commended itself to the academicians, it 
has not won the assent of the Supreme Court. In Powell v. 
McCormack,215 the House of Representatives argued that the ex-
clusion of Adam Clayton Powell on grounds not enumerated in 
the Constitution was supported by earlier, similar House exclusions; 
but the Court declared: "That an unconstitutional action has been 
taken before surely does not render that same action any less un-
constitutional at a later date."276 From George Washington on,277 
"usurpation" of power has not been a mere pejorative expletive but 
in the Convention. Madison moved to "except treaties of peace" from the two-thirds 
concurrence provision. Gerry objected that treaties of peace were of especial importance; 
and Hugh Williamson stated, "Treaties of peace should be guarded at least by requir-
ing the same concurrence as in other Treaties." 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 30, at 540-41. 
The exception was rejected. For the Framers a treaty of peace was unmistakably 
a "special kind of agreement," for reasons which were not at all "mysterious." 
274. A "practice so deeply embedded in our governmental structure should be 
treated as decisive of the constitutional issue." Monaghan, supra note 4, at 31. "[H)istory 
has legitimated the practice of presidential war-making." Id. at 29. For similar views, 
see Ratner, The Coordinated Warmaking Power-Legislative, Executive and Judicial 
Roles, 44 S. CAL. L. R.Ev. 461, 467 (1971). Cf. Reveley, supra note 4, at 1250-57. 
"If acts forbidden by a reasonable reading of the rules continue to be performed it 
is highly unrealistic to regard the rules as complete statements of the law. To con-
stitute 'the law' the course of conduct dictated by the rules must be the one followed 
in actual practice." Reveley, supra, at 1253, citing McDougal, Jurisprudence for a Free 
Society, 1 GA. L. R.Ev. 1, 4 (1966). We cannot march "in the lock-step of the Framers' 
intent, •.• upon occasion even the clear intent of the Drafters must be abandoned 
without the process of formal amendment, if the Constitution is to minister suc-
cessfully to needs created by changing times." Reveley, supra, at 1253. What are the 
"needs" for presidential war-making, or for presidential monopoly of foreign relations? 
Compare note 192 supra. 
In justice to Reveley, he equally condemns the automatic assumption that practice 
makes constitutional, supra, at 1253, and proffers a compromise, which all too shortly 
put is: "In determining the meaning of any constitutional provision, the ultimate 
criterion must be the long-term best interests of the country." Reveley, supra, at 1251, 
1253-56. Who is to determine that issue? If that decision is for the President, analysis 
is little advanced. Under the Constitution, the decision maker must be the people, by 
means of an amendment. 
John Quincy Adams arraigned President Tyler in 1842 for "gross abuse of con-
stitutional power, and bold assumption of power never vested in him by law." Quoted 
in Warren, Presidential Declaration• of Independence, 10 B.U. L. R.Ev. 1, 13 (1930). 
275. 395 U.S. 486 (1969). 
276. 395 U.S. at 546. In Youngstown Sheet &: Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 549, 588 
(1952), the Court stated: "It is said that other Presidents without congressional 
authority have taken possession of private business enterprises in order to settle labor 
disputes. But even if this be true, Congress has not thereby lost its exclusive consti• 
tutional authority to make laws necessary and proper to carry out the powers" vested 
in the Government. 
277. See text accompanying note 292 infra. 
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expressive rather of an abiding fear fed by the deepest wells of our 
constitutional history.21s 
It is therefore McDougal and Lans, I suggest, who were word-
intoxicated. For the issue is not one of words but of power. Whence 
does the President derive authority to transfer to himself exclusively 
the power conferred by the Constitution on President and Senate 
jointly? To this McDougal and Lans replied, 
[i]t is utterly fantastic to suppose that a document framed 150 years 
ago "to start a government experiment for an agricultural, sectional, 
seaboard folk of some three millions" could be interpreted today 
... in terms of the "true meaning" of its original Framers for the 
purpose of controlling the "government of a nation, a hundred and 
thirty millions strong, whose population and advanced industrial 
civilization have spread across a continent." Each generation of citi-
zens must in a very real sense interpret the words of the Framers to 
create its own constitution.279 
From which "generation of citizens" did the President derive a 
mandate to revise the Constitution under the guise of "interpre-
tation"? 
It is not as if the Framers did not foresee that the fledgling, sea-
coast nation would cover the continent and from time to time need 
to change the Constitution. For in Article V they provided a process 
of amendment, not, to be sure, made too easy;280 but this was for 
protection of minorities against roughshod majorities. Because, in 
the words of McDougal and Lans, "the process of amendment is 
politically difficult, other modes of change have emerged."281 Truly 
278. For citations, see BERGER, CONGRESS, supra note 32, at 12-14, 24, 126-27, 131-33, 
136-40. 
279. McDougal &: Lans, supra note 5, at 214-15, quoting from Llewellyn, The 
Constitution as an Institution, 34 CoLUM. L. REv. I, 3 (1934). Ratner, supra note 274, at 
467, tells us that "constitutional policy for ensuing epochs is not congealed in the 
mold of 1787 referants." 
280. The Founders fully understood the difficulties of amendment. Thus Patrick 
Henry argued in the Virginia Convention, "four of the smallest states, that do not 
collectively contain one tenth part of the population ••• may obstruct the most salutary 
and necessary amendments." 3 J. ELLIOT, supra note 30, at 49. But the prevailing view 
was expressed in the North Carolina Convention by James Iredell: The Constitution 
"can be altered with as much regularity, and as little confusion, as any Act of As-
sembly; not, indeed, quite so easily, which would be extremely impolitic ••• so that 
alterations can without difficulty be made agreeable to the general sense of the people." 
4 id. at 177. In Massachusetts, Charles Jarvis said, "[W]e shall have in this article an 
adequate provision for all the purposes of political reformation." 2 Id. at 116. 
281. McDougal &: Lans, supra note 5, at 293. The young Woodrow Wilson, in 
CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT 242 (1885), likewise stated that "[t]he legal processes of 
constitutional change are so slow and cumbersome that we have been constrained to 
adopt a serviceable framework of fictions which enables us easily to preserve the forms 
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a marvelous non sequitur: because the amending process is cumber-
some-and designedly so-the servants of the people may informally 
amend the Constitution without consulting them!282 
"The people," said James Iredell, "have chosen to be governed 
under such and such principles. They have not chosen to be gov-
erned or promised to submit upon any other . . . .''283 Conscious 
that a mandate for change must proceed from the people, McDougal 
and Lans argue that 
[t]he crucial constitutional fact is that the people (Presidents, Su-
preme Court Justices, Senators, Congressmen and electorate) who 
have lived under the document for 150 years have interpreted it ... 
[to] authorize the making of international agreements other than 
treaties on most of the important problems of peace and war.284 
Now the inescapable fact is that such issues have never really been 
explained to the people;285 much less has the judgment of the elec-
without laboriously obeying the spirit of the Constitution • • . ."I Because of the 
"difficulty of its formal amendment process, alteration by usage has proved to be the 
principal means of modifying our fundamental law." Reveley, supra note 4, at 1252. 
Amendment is difficult: ergo, the President writes himself a blank check to act outside 
constitutional bounds. 
282. In the First Congress, Elbridge Gerry, one of the Framers, stated, "If it is 
an omitted case, an attempt in the legislature to supply the defect, will in fact be an 
attempt to amend the Constitution. But this can only be done in the way pointed 
out by the fifth article of that instrument, and an attempt to amend it any other way 
may be a high crime or misdemeanor ••.. " The people, he added, have "directed a 
particular mode of making amendments, which we are not at liberty to depart from. 
. • • Such a power would render the most important clause in the Constitution 
nugatory." 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 503 (1789). The Doyen of American legal historians, 
Willard Hurst, remarked in our time that the informal amendment approach "is a 
way of practically reading Article V out of the Federal Constitution •••. [The Framers] 
provided a defined, regular procedure for changing or adapting it." Discussion in E. 
CAHN, SUPREME COURT AND SUPREME LAW 74 (1954). "The framers of the Constitution 
might have adopted a different method • • • • It is not the function of courts or 
legislative bodies, national or state, to alter the method which the Constitution has 
fixed." Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221, 227 (1920). 
283. 2 G. McREE, LIFE AND CORRESPONDENCE OF JAMES !REDELL 146 (1857). See also 
BERGER, CONGRESS, supra note 32, at 13-14. 
284. McDougal & Lans, supra note 5, at 216 (emphasis added). They also state that 
"[i]n preferring to alter the Constitution by informal adaptation, the American people 
have also been motivated by a wise realization of the inevitable transiency of political 
arrangements." Id. at 294 (emphasis added). 
285. Compare Professor Felix Frankfurter's advice to President Franklin D. Roosevelt 
in 1937: "[T]he Supreme Court for about a quarter of a century has distorted the power 
of judicial review into a revision of legislative policy, thereby usurping powers belong-
ing to the Congress ..•. " And "[p]eople have been taught to believe that when the 
Supreme Court speaks it is not they who speak but the Constitution, whereas, of course, 
in so many vital cases, it is they who speak and not the Constitution. And I verily 
believe that that is what the country needs most to understand." RoosEVELT AND FRANK• 
FURTER: THEIR CORRESPONDENCE, 1928-1945, at 384, 383 (M. Freedman ed. 1967) (em-
phasis original). 
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torate ever been solicited. Would "the people," for example, have 
approved the Supreme Court's freshly minted "interpretation" of 
"due process" in the 1880's-whereby it repeatedly overturned 
amelioratory socio-economic legislation-had they been told that up 
to that time "due process" connoted "procedural" due process only, 
which did not vitiate such legislation, and that the shift to a 
"substantive" content was a purely judicial construct without 
foundation in constitutional history?286 Would "the people" approve 
the presidential revision whereunder the President claims power, 
acting alone, to commit us to a Vietnam War, if they were told that 
the bloodletting is justified, not by the constitutional text nor by the 
intention of the Framers (which runs clearly to the contrary), but by 
a boot-strap theory of power built upon successive usurpations?287 
Reveley, who is sympathetic to amendment by "usage," sapiently 
observes that the "general public takes a relatively black letter view 
of the Constitution," and that the "subtleties" of amendment "by 
usage ... would probably be lost on the general public."288 It is 
therefore idle to impute informal ratification of the presidential 
power take-over to "the people." "The people" have been told that 
the President has exercised power conferred upon him by the Con-
stitution, by which, in their benighted way, they understand textual 
warrant, not a long-continued violation of the Constitution. 
Alexander Hamilton, the daring pioneer advocate of expanded 
presidential powers, stated with respect to the express treaty powers 
(as distinguished from a power merely rested on "usage") that 
a delegated authority [e.g., the President] cannot alter the constitut-
ing act, unless so expressly authorized by the constituting power. 
286. Charles P. Curtis, an ardent advocate of "adaptation" of the Constitution, 
states that when the Framers put "due process of law ••• into the Fifth Amendment, 
its meaning was as fixed and definite as the common law could make a phrase. It had 
been chiseled into the law so incisively that any lawyer and a few others, could read 
it and understand it. It meant a procedural process, which could be easily ascertained 
from almost any law book. We turned the legal phrase into common speech and 
raised its meaning into the similitude of justice itself." Curtis, Review and Majority 
Rule, in E. CAHN, supra note 282, at 170, 177. McCloskey refers to "the years after 
1877 when the slow accumulation of precedent was transmuting the due process clause 
and the commerce clause into the legal embodiment of a laissez-faire philosophy." 
R. MCCLOSKEY, THE MODERN SUPREME COURT 206 (1972). See also Hamilton, The Path of 
Due Process of Law, in THE CONSTITUTION RECONSIDERED 167 (C. Read ed. 1938). 
287. Seeking to strike a compromise between "strict construction" and free "adapta-
tion," Reveley, supra note 4, at 1293, states that "uuless there is pressing need for its 
amendment, popular understanding of the rule of law dictates adherence to provisions 
whose language and initial intent seems clear. The power vested in Congress to declare 
war is a primal instance of such a provision." 
288. Reveley, supra note 4, at 1293, 1255 n.31. 
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An agent cannot new model his own commission. A treaty, for ex-
ample, cannot trans/ er the legislative power to the executive depart-
ment.289 
Now Hamilton's followers would claim that the President can by 
virtue of his own "usage" "new model his own commission" and 
"transfer the legislative power to the executive." 
To a believer in constitutional government, in the separation 
of powers as a safeguard against dictatorship,290 there is no room for 
a take-over by the President of powers that were denied to him, and, 
as our times demonstrate, denied with good reason. "Ours is a 
government of divided authority," declared Justice Black in 1957, 
"on the assumption that in division there is not only strength but 
freedom from tyranny."291 If present exigencies demand a redis-
tribution of powers in which Congress was originally fully to share-
a presidential power by his conduct of foreign affairs to propel the 
nation into war without consulting Congress-that decision ought 
candidly to be submitted to the people in the form of a proposed 
amendment, not masked by euphemisms. For me, the polestar 
remains the advice given to the nation by George Washington: 
The necessity of reciprocal checks in the exercise of political power; 
by dividing and distributing it into different depositories, and consti-
tuting each the guardian of the Public Weal against invasions by the 
others has been evinced .... To preserve them must be as necessary 
as to institute them. If in the opinion of the People, the distribution 
or modification of the Constitutional powers be in any particular 
wrong, let it be corrected by an amendment in the way which the 
Constitution designates. But let there be no change by usurpation; 
for though this, in one instance, may be the instrument of good, it is 
the customary weapon by which free governments are destroyed. The 
precedent must always greatly overbalance in permanent evil any 
partial or transient benefit which the use can at any time yield.292 
289. Letters of Camillus, 6 A. HAMILTON, supra note 91, at 166 (emphasis added). 
290. See note 270 supra. 
291. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 40 (1957). 
292. 35 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 228-29 a. Fitzpatrick ed. 1940). 
The Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, art. XVIII, states that the people "have a 
right to require of their lawgivers and magistrates an exact and constant observance" 
of the "fundamental principles of the constitution" which are "absolutely necessary to 
preserve the advantages of liberty and to maintain a free government." 1 B. PooRE, 
supra note 96, at 959. 
How does Washington's advice square with the statement that the Constitution is 
"being ceaselessly adapted, as its Framers intended, to the problems of 'ages to come'"? 
McDougal &: Lans, supra note 5, at 294 (emphasis added). Marshall expressly dis-
claimed that his "ages to come" dictum was meant to condone any enlargement of 
powers. See Berger, War-Making, supra note 17, at 50-52. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
It cannot seriously be maintained that either solo presidential 
executive agreements or a presidential monopoly of foreign relations 
in particular negotiations, find warrant in the constitutional text. 
Instead, the unmistakable intention of the Founders was to con-
stitute the Senate an equal partner in this domain for the greater 
security of the nation. The argument for monopoly is rested on long-
continued practice-"adaptation by usage" -which in less polite 
terms means that the executive may "new model his own com-
mission." That way, sober scholars have concluded, lies the road to 
dictatorship.293 
Already solo presidential operations have plunged the nation 
into calamitous and divisive adventures. In that light, to move from 
constitutional to practical considerations, such deficiencies as Senate 
participation may exhibit294 are greatly overshadowed by the perils 
of presidential monopoly. A presidential reallocation of constitu-
tional powers, to paraphrase Washington, is a cure worse than the 
disease. Whatever the force of the practical arguments, assumptions 
of practical convenience are hardly a basis for setting aside express 
constitutional provisions. 
Arguments of practical convenience and wisdom, moreover, run 
at least as strongly against as for "monopoly" claims. Behind presi-
dential claims to sole control lies the complacent assumption that 
the President and his advisers have a monopoly on wisdom.295 One 
need not subscribe to all the harsh criticism of presidential policy 
in Vietnam to entertain large doubts as to its wisdom. Recently, the 
President's neglect to advise Japan of his forthcoming visit to China, 
his heavy-handed treatment of Japanese economic relations with 
the United States have, in the opinion of former Under Secretary 
of State George Ball, needlessly alienated the Japanese and danger-
293. R. DAHL, supra note 6, at 116, 264; Kurland, supra note 145, at 625, 628. 
294. For suggested internal reforms of Congress, see R. DAHL, supra note 6, at 
140-68. 
295. For citations, see Berger, War-Making, supra note 17, at 84. 
At the time of the Roosevelt-Churchill Atlantic Conference, "President and State 
Department believed they had information, experience, and a grasp of issues involved 
that Congress and electorate lacked. Responsibility to Congress, they evidently be-
lieved, would have led to suicidal policies. They therefore chose to avoid Congres-
sional control over certain aspects of foreign policy." R. DAHL, supra note 6, at 180. 
Dahl concludes that if Roosevelt's appraisal was correct, "this is the severest condemna-
tion possible of the arrangement for information and intelligence [i.e., presidential 
withholding on the theory of executive privilege] by which Congress as contrasted with 
the President possessed such a terrifying incapacity for rationality and understanding 
of international events in a moment of great national crisis." Id. 
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ously strained if not irretrievably injured a valuable alliance.296 
Presidents, too, can be lacking in wisdom. 
It is a mistake to exalt presidential over senatorial expertise in 
the conduct of foreign affairs. Granted that the State Department 
may develop a corps of experts, "the more closely debate moves 
towards broad and basic policy," Robert Dahl notes, "the more 
competent is the legislative decision likely to be, and correspond-
ingly less competent is the expert."297 Nor is the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee to be underrated in terms of expertise. Over 
the years, the Committee has had within its ranks "an imposing 
array of great names" ;298 today the Chairman, Senator J. William 
Fulbright, measures up to any member of the State Department in 
sheer intellectual power and experience.299 A sampling of the 1928-
1949 period disclosed that a foreign policy proposal was likely to be 
examined by men "who ha[ d] been serving on the Foreign Relations 
Committee for almost seven and a half years on the average-a 
rather substantial apprenticeship."30° Contrast this with appoint-
ments as Secretary of State of men like William Rogers, who had 
virtually no experience in foreign affairs.301 Consultation with the 
296. Ball, We Are Playing a Dangerous Game with Japan, N.Y. Times, June 25, 
1972, § 6 (Magazine), at 10. Moreover, there is "no guarantee that all the rationality 
of the executive-administrative will be used for any other purpose than fulfilling in 
foreigu policy the private preferences of the President or members of the State Depart-
ment." R. DAHL, supra note 6, at 181. For example, "the most remarkable feature of 
[Lord] Halifax's unwavering support for the appeasement of Nazi Germany was his 
utter incomprehension of the widespread and growing revulsion for this policy." 
P. R.IcHARDs, supra note 7, at 73. 
297. R. DAHL, supra note 6, at 244. 
298. Id. at 146. Among others were Andrew Jackson, Henry Clay, Daniel Webster, 
Stephen A. Douglas, William H. Seward, Charles Sumner, Elihu Root, Henry Cabot 
Lodge. 
299. As a freshman member of the House, Fulbright introduced a resolution in 
1943 respecting post-war participation in an organization for preservation of peace, to 
avoid a repetition of the Versailles Treaty rejection. J. ROBINSON, CoNGRESS A.ND FOR· 
EIGN POLICY MAKING: A STUDY IN LEGISLATIVE INFLUENCE A.ND lNITIA.TlVE 33-34 (1962). 
Robinson, at 211, states: "Fulbright's reputation in and out of the Senate is that of a 
thoughtful, learned man, perhaps one of the most intellectual Senators in the whole 
history of the institution. He has been identified with many 'right' and far-sighted 
positions since he was elected to the Senate in 1944." Former Ambassador John 
Kenneth Galbraith stated, "Over the last half-decade Fulbright, Morse, Gruening, 
Kennedy, Cooper, Church, Hatfield and McGovern have surely been more sensible 
than the senior officials of the Department of State. On the average I think we are 
safer if we keep foreign policy under the influence of men who must be re-elected." 
Galbraith, Book Review, N.Y. Times, Oct. 8, 1972, § 7, at 1, 12. 
300. R. DAHL, supra note 6, at 148. 
301. Viscount James Bryce, who served as British Ambassador to the United States 
and was an informed observer of the American political scene, stated that the Secretary 
of State "is sometimes a man of first-rate gifts, but more frequently only a politician 
selected because of his party standing, and possessing little knowledge of world affairs." 
2 J. BRYCE, MODERN DEMOCRACIES 373 (1921). The example par excellence is Wilson's 
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Senate therefore broadens the range of experience that may be 
brought to bear on a problem.802 Its utility is attested by the fact 
that a galaxy of noted State Department executives-] ohn Hay, 
Elihu Root, George Marshall, Robert Lovett, and W. Averill Harri-
man-were in the habit of consulting with the Senate.808 
Harriman emphasized that if foreign policy is to obtain support, 
the people must understand it; the Senate is the forum of debate 
which enlightens public opinion804 and facilitates a rational decision 
by the electorate. Such debate "serves to expose differences, dis-
unity."805 Singlehanded control of foreign policy "may lead to 
policies for which there is inadequate support, as with Wilson, and 
had not Pearl Harbor intervened, conceivably with Roosevelt,"806 
and at the moment, with Vietnam. Now that war is an instrument 
of foreign policy, consultation with the Senate-and thus with the 
people who are to shed their blood in effectuation of that policy-
selection of William Jennings Bryan, who went on to glory in the Scopes' Monkey 
Trial. 
302. Senator Augustus Bacon said in 1906: 
There are Senators here who have been here for a generation and whose advice 
and counsel would be valuable to any President •••• An Election to the Presidency 
does not ipso facto endow one with all knowledge and wisdom, and it is not an 
unreasonable suggestion that in the aggregate of ninety Senators, many of them 
men of large experience, there is more knowledge of public affairs, more of correct 
judgment, of the requirements of the public interests than is possessed by any 
one man in the United States, whoever he may be. 
40 CoNG. REG. 2137. Recall Benjamin Franklin's tribute to the collective judgment at 
the end of the Federal Convention. 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 30, at 642. 
303. Hearings, supra note 13, at 262-63, 359-60; J. ROBINSON, supra note 299, at 45, 47. 
Lovett stated that "when a line ••• had the imprimatur of the Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee, we ••• [knew] that we were going to be backed up, and that is of 
tremendous importance in negotiation." K. BAILEY &: D. SAMUEL, CONGRESS AT Woruc 
387-88 (1952). For additional examples of presidential collaboration with the Senate, 
see J. ROBINSON, supra, at 37, 50, 54; R. DAHL, supra note 6, at 207-10. 
30·1. Harriman, a veteran participant in foreign affairs, stated, "[N]o foreign policy 
will stick unless the American people are behind it. And unless Congress understands 
it the American people aren't going to understand it." Hearings, supra note 13, at 360. 
See CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT, supra note 6, at 224. Even those doughty advocates of 
executive agreements, McDougal and I.ans, consider that in "any situation reference of 
an important international agreement to Congress has the undoubted advantage of 
stimulating public discussion of the issues involved and permits the Executive's judg-
ment to be questioned and checked by independent critics •••• " McDougal &: Lans, 
supra note 5, at 555-56. 
305. R. DAHL, supra note 6, at 125. "In the conduct of foreign affairs, unity is one 
of the most important assets leadership can possess, disagreement one of the greatest 
liabilities." Id. at 221. See also id. at 262. In addition to the examples cited by Dahl, 
there is the current divisiveness over Vietnam, which toppled one President and has 
strewn boulders in the path of another, in no little part because the people were not 
really consulted. Compare the split in the English cabinet and Parliament immediately 
before the outbreak of World War I, bridged over only when Germany invaded Bel-
gium. B. TUCHMAN, supra note 4, at 91, 118. 
306. R. DAHL, supra note 6, at 173. It was "primarily a deep-seated distrust of lead-
ership that forced the rigid and inflexible provisions into the neutrality legislation of 
the pre-war period." Id. at 248. Cf. id. at 178-79. 
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is indispensable.307 Popular judgment of such issues is not to be held 
in contempt.308 Viscount James Bryce, a devoted admirer of the 
democratic process, deduced from a number of examples that in the 
democracies the people had judged more wisely than those to whom 
the conduct of foreign affairs was confided, whereas "the faults 
chargeable to monarchs and oligarchies have been less pardonable 
and more harmful to the peace and progress of mankind."309 
Upon a foreign policy fashioned by a behind-the-scenes conclave 
which, a recent critic charges, is accountable neither to Congress nor 
the people,310 McDougal and Lans have themselves made the fitting 
comment: 
[U]ntil we are furnished with a formula for the selection of the elite, 
we are entitled to doubt that the minority has any unique monop-
oly of wisdom. Government by a self-designated elite-like that of 
benevolent despotism or of Plato's philosopher kings-may be a 
good form of government for some people, but it is not the American 
way.all 
307. What Joseph Story said of the power to declare war is no less applicable to 
foreign policy which must embroil us in war: it is "so critical and calamitous, that it 
requires the utmost deliberation, and the successive review of all the councils of the 
nation . • • . The representatives of the people . • . have a right to be consulted as 
to its propriety and necessity." 2 J. STORY, supra note ll8, § ll71, at 91-92. The princi-
ples which "inspire a nation's foreign policy [are] ••• too grave in consequences, to be 
determined by any authority lower than that of the people." 2 J. BRYCE, supra note 301, 
at 368. For a policy that entails widespread sacrifice, "widespread agreement is neces-
sary." R. DAHL, supra note 6, at 222. 'Without it, we witness the wide-scale draft evasion 
and desertion of the current Vietnam conflict. 
308. In a book review of D. ACHESON, GRAPES FROM THORNS (1972), Alfred Kazin 
remarks that Acheson "distrust[ed] the popular mind" and that a "striking omission" 
from the "record of his years in the State Department, 'Present at the Creation,' is 
any consideration of how his foreign policy related to the people." N.Y. Times, May 
28, 1972, § 7, at 2, 24. 
Acheson himself recorded in PRESENT AT THE CREATION 101 (1969) the "angnishing 
hours" he spent in the Senate to "suffer fools gladly." "People like Mr. Acheson,'' 
testified Senator Fulbright, "make no bones about it. They just say [Senators] are 
boobs and ought to have nothing to do with foreign policy •..• " Hearings, supra 
note 13, at 468. Acheson, Ambassador Douglas Dillon stated, "made great mistakes in 
foreign policy because he never took the country and the Congress into his confidence." 
C. SULZBERGER, supra note 190, at 1017. 
309. 2 J. BRYCE, supra note 301, at 383. Of conflicts between the Ministers and 
working-class opinion over the American Civil War, the Russo-Turkish War and the 
Boer War, Bryce states, "[I]n all three cases the 'classes' [who conducted foreign affairs] 
would appear to have been less wise than the 'masses.'" Id. at 377, 379. Consider t.{le 
gross miscalculations of the German and Austro-Hungarian regimes which triggered 
World War I. See also note 295 supra. 
310. R. BARNET, ROOTS OF THE WAR (1972). Senator Fulbright complained of the 
"centralization of foreign policy powers in a small elite of experts and intellectuals 
surrounding the President. One of the most striking revelations to emerge from the 
Pentagon papers was the extraordinary secrecy with which the inner circle of the 
Johnson administration made their fateful decisions of 1964 and 1965.'' Hearings, supra 
note 13, at 23. 
311. McDougal &: Lans, supra note 5, at 577-78. The authors were referring to a 
"minority" of the Senate. 
